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ABSTRACT
The training of lawyers for years has established ethical and
practice protocols based upon an individual representation model, or,
if the protocols contemplated a form of collective representation, they
have envisioned formal, structured entities with powerful constituents.
The good lawyers who represent the dispossessed, the exploited, and
the powerless need to craft different protocols, ones which accept
messier, less organized, and often contentious group representation.
Writing about the ethical and political mission of “community law-
yers” has flourished, but that scholarship has tended to elide some
knotty practical questions about the lawyers’ professional responsibil-
ities in their work with such groups.  This Article is a beginning at-
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Young University Law School and held at UCLA School of Law, and at a faculty collo-
quium at Boston College Law School, and I thank the participants at those workshops for
their insights.  I have also received helpful ideas from Mark Aaronson, Alexis Anderson,
Susan Bennett, Paul Bergman, Michael Diamond and Judy McMorrow, and I thank those
kind friends.  I also thank Dean John Garvey and Boston College Law School for financial
support, and Allison Diop-Frimpong and Josh Minty for valuable research assistance.
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tempt to review community group representation through the lens of
a traditional “law of lawyering” perspective.
A lawyer who accepts a “community group” as her client must
attend to all of the professional ethical mandates applicable to more
conventional corporate and partnership representation.  She must dis-
tinguish with great care whether her client is an aggregate of commu-
nity members, or an entity, and much will depend on the outcome of
that discernment.  The lawyer must engage the group members to as-
sist them to decide which of those statuses will apply, and, in doing
so, she must be clear about her relationship with the members as they
make that choice.
If the community group lawyer accepts the group as her client,
she must uncover, or create, an authority scheme on which she may
rely for her direction.  Once she has accomplished that, the commu-
nity group lawyer may counsel her clients in ways different from how
she would counsel an individual client with an individual legal mat-
ter.  In representing any entity, the lawyer will owe to the entity con-
stituents a different—one might say lesser—deference for their
preferences and their leanings, because of their status as proxies for a
larger client.  The more loosely-structured the entity is (and there is
much evidence that community group representation will involve
many loosely-structured groups), the greater the responsibility of the
lawyer to ensure that the constituent with whom she meets is a faithful
proxy for the wishes of the group.
In addition to attending to her ethical responsibilities emerging
from the very fact that her client is a group, the community lawyer
must recognize further special duties from the fact that her client is
not just a group, but a community group.  This Article uncovers three
considerations peculiar to the community group representation con-
text.  For those groups with explicit public missions, the lawyer has a
responsibility to attend to that public mission, in ways she may not
have permission to do for groups established to achieve purely pri-
vate ends.  At the same time (and often at odds with the prior commit-
ment), the community group lawyer must attend with special care to
the empowerment and group cohesion aspects of the group’s work.
Finally (and, again, at odds with the prior commitment), the commu-
nity group lawyer may at times possess some moral duty to intervene
with her group client to establish conditions, even if not chosen by the
group, that are likely to increase the autonomy and the power of the
group in the long run.
The ideas developed in this Article emerge from the rich litera-
ture from so many progressive scholars over the past twenty-five
years or more.  The ideas need to be tested, nurtured and critiqued,
though, especially by more stories from the field.  The test of the ethi-
cal ideas will come from their usefulness in practice.  This Article rep-
resents a beginning effort to offer a systematic structure, grounded in
established theories of the law of lawyering, upon which to make
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those ongoing assessments.
INTRODUCTION
“Community lawyering” is a prominent commitment among pro-
gressive legal scholars and clinical teachers.1  Lawyers who work with
poor and disadvantaged clients encounter those clients situated within
important community contexts, and frequently as members of collec-
tivities.2  The rich literature of community lawyering aims to explicate
the delicate relationship between the expert professional and her cli-
ents, with special reference to the power dynamics within those rela-
tionships,3 to fostering group coherence,4 and to conceptions of
1 As Ascanio Piomelli (among others) has observed, the concept of community law-
yering is known by many terms, including rebellious lawyering, critical lawyering, facilita-
tive lawyering, and collaborative lawyering (although writers disagree about the fungibility
of those terms). See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault’s Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits
for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 398 n.6.  As the discussion in the text
will make apparent, my subject is not limited to the “rebellious” version of working with
disadvantaged communities, but easily (and perhaps most readily) applies to the “regnant”
kind of work as well. See GERALD P. LO´PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S
VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 11-82 (1992) (contrasting rebellious and regnant
lawyering).  In addition to the many sources cited throughout this article, important contri-
butions to the community lawyering literature include Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting
Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007);
Anthony Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993); Sameer M. Ashar, Law
Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008); Sameer M. Ashar,
Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007); Susan D.
Bennett, Little Engines that Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the
Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469 [hereinafter Bennett, Little Engines that Could];
Christina Z. Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communi-
ties, 24 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 229 (2000); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protago-
nist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2133 (2007); Ze-
nobia Lai, et al., The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community
Lawyering, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1 (2000); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethi-
cal Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2000); Ann Southworth, Collective
Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of Accountability, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2449 (1999); Karen Tokarz, Nancy L. Cook, Susan Brooks & Brenda Bratton
Blom, Conversations on “Community Lawyering”: The Newest (Oldest) Wave in Clinical
Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 359 (2008); Lucie E. White, Collaborative
Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV.
157 (1994).
2 See Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1, at 472-73; Michael Diamond &
Aaron O’Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: The Community Lawyer’s Dilemma
When Representing Non-Democratic Client Organizations, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481,
486-87 (2004).
3 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1750 (1994)
(Book Review); Piomelli, supra note 1, at 446-49; Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering
for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1998)
[hereinafter White, Facing South].
4 See JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS (2005); Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2.
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“building community.”5  Prominent within this literature (sometimes
implicitly so, but more frequently explicitly) is the contest between
those traditional ethical bookends of autonomy and paternalism—that
is, between a moral stance that views the professional’s role as non-
directive and respectful of the wisdom of clients, and one that accepts
the professional’s active intervention in the choice-making of the cli-
ents for the greater good of the clients.6
This Article contributes to that extensive conversation in one dis-
crete but seemingly important way.  In the spirit of what has come to
be known (if perhaps controversially) as the “best practices” approach
to lawyering,7 my aim here is to understand the practical, workaday
implications of advising a community group or its membership, espe-
cially (but not only) with disadvantaged groups.  I invoke the “best
practices” theme purposefully.  While the ongoing scholarly conversa-
tions about working with disadvantaged communities are sophisti-
cated and impassioned, they often sidestep—at times intentionally, at
times seemingly not—questions about lawyering effectiveness and
skill, professional responsibility, the laws of lawyering and, dare I say
it, malpractice considerations.  I write here for lawyers and law stu-
dents beginning such a practice in an effort to understand with them
the professional implications of this kind of work.8
5 See MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVI-
TALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001); Andrea M. Seielstad, Community Building as a
Means of Teaching Creative, Cooperative, and Complex Problem Solving in Clinical Legal
Education, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 445 (2001).
6 The autonomy/beneficence continuum has played a prominent role in medical ethics,
see, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
272-80 (6th ed. 2008) (describing how the principles interact), and, with homage to the
medical ethicists, in legal ethics, see, e.g., Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision-
making: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).  The
critical scholarship addressing progressive lawyers and their work with disadvantaged cli-
ents has continued to struggle with those essential tensions, although in ways quite differ-
ent from the medical field or the conventional legal ethics context. See text accompanying
notes 282-307 infra for a discussion of the progressive critiques.
7 In recent years the concept of “best practices” has appeared in a variety of contexts.
See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND
A ROAD MAP (2007); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANNE COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER,
LLOYD BOYD & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFES-
SION OF LAW (2007) (known as the “Carnegie Report”); J.P. OGILVY, LEAH WORTHAM,
AND LISA G. LERMAN, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TEXT FOR LEGAL EXTERNS (2007) (models of practice for students in out-placement set-
tings).  For a deep critique of the use of the “best practices” concept, see Ira P. Robbins,
Best Practices on “Best Practices”: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 269
(2009).  For a defense of the use of the concept, see Roy Stuckey, “Best Practices” or Not,
It Is Time to Re-Think Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 307 (2009).
8 My impetus to explore these questions is three-fold.  Since 2008 I have directed and
taught in a new transactional clinic at Boston College Law School, after many years of
supervising students in various litigation clinics.  My new encounter with group clients,
nonprofits, and unincorporated associations has raised several questions for me and for my
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This Article will examine the strategic and ethical implications for
a lawyer engaged in the representation of, and more specifically the
counseling of, community groups.  My ideas emerge with great hom-
age to the many colleagues who have written in the past about repre-
sentation of community groups, and especially to three prominent
scholars upon whose wisdom I draw a great deal—Susan Bennett,9
Michael Diamond,10 and Stephen Ellmann.11  While I may not always
agree with the arguments or proposals offered by these three writers
(or they with me), their work deeply informs my analyses here.
If counseling community groups were a seamless application of
conventional counseling practices, building on the pioneering insights
of David Binder and Susan Price12 and their progeny,13 then a work
such as this would have little of interest to say.  In fact, however, coun-
seling a community group is different in significant ways from the typi-
cal counseling conception used to teach that skill to law students and
students, questions which I puzzle through here.  That new teaching responsibility coin-
cides with my co-authors and I embarking upon a revision of an interviewing and counsel-
ing textbook, and one of my tasks on the new edition will be to address community group
counseling. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE, PAUL R. TREM-
BLAY & IAN WEINSTEIN, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (3d
ed.) (forthcoming 2011).  In addition, Alicia Alvarez and I are in the process of creating a
new book to accompany a transactional clinic seminar curriculum, and that text will ad-
dress the issues explored in this Article. See ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
TRANSACTIONAL CLINIC SEMINAR COMPANION (West Academic Publishing, forthcoming
2012).
9 Susan Bennett, Director of the Community and Economic Development Law Clinic
at American University’s Washington College of Law, has written extensively and  with
great insight about lawyers working with community groups. See Susan D. Bennett, Creat-
ing a Client Consortium: Building Social Capital, Bridging Structural Holes, 13 CLINICAL L.
REV. 67 (2006) [hereinafter Bennett, Creating a Client Consortium]; Susan D. Bennett,
Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in a Community Economic Development Clinic, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 45 (2002) [hereinafter Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem];
Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1; Susan D. Bennett, Long Haul Lawyering,
25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771 (1998).
10 Michael Diamond, Director of the Harrison Institute for Housing and Community
Development at the Georgetown University Law Center, has been a leading, if provoca-
tive, voice on questions of the proper role of lawyers working with fluid community groups.
See Diamond, supra note 1; Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2.
11 Stephen Ellmann, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Collaborative
Learning at New York Law School, is the author of perhaps the most influential writing
about representation of group clients. See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multi-
plied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Repre-
sentation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
12 In 1977, David Binder, then a young clinical professor at UCLA School of Law, and
Susan Price, a professor of psychology at UCLA, created a pathbreaking work on inter-
viewing and counseling in the legal profession. See DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LE-
GAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
13 See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004)[hereinafter
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS].
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lawyers—that of an individual client and his individual personal or
commercial affairs.  The differences stem from the fact that the lawyer
is counseling a “group,” and from the fact that the group is a “commu-
nity” group.  This Article will examine the implications of each of
those factors separately.  The goal of this Article is to meld insights
from accepted ethical principles regarding group and entity represen-
tation with those from the rich “community lawyering” scholarship to
craft workable and practical recommendations for lawyers engaged in
this work.
The Article will work toward that goal in the following way.  It
begins with a refresher about the goals and the structures of what we
might understand here as “conventional” counseling—the paradig-
matic counseling of an individual client by a lawyer regarding some
important legal decision affecting that individual’s personal or busi-
ness affairs.  With that baseline established, the Article then turns to
the ways in which a lawyer’s practice would change if her client were
not an individual, but instead were a “group.”  That discussion neces-
sarily requires a clarification of terms, so that we know what we mean
by a “group.”  As we shall see, a group may come to the lawyer in two
guises—well structured, and loosely-structured.  It is critical to distin-
guish between those types of groups, for a lawyer’s responsibilities will
be different in important ways depending upon the organizational in-
tegrity of the entity client.14  It is equally important to distinguish a
true group client from a collection of individual clients represented at
the same time by the lawyer.  For our purposes, that latter configura-
tion may not meet the definition of a “group client,” but, because of
its importance to this area, the Article examines briefly the counseling
strategies involved in working with multiple clients simultaneously.15
Using the conventional Legal Interviewing and Counseling-gener-
ated counseling model as a starting point, the Article recommends
some adjustments to the standard approach for use in group client
settings.  The modifications stem primarily from the fact that the ac-
tors speaking for the client in the group setting are not clients at all,
but are fiduciaries for the clients.  That fact has moral and strategic
implications for the lawyer, especially on the question of how directive
the lawyer ought to be in her work with the client representative.16
Two considerations seem important here.  First, when representing a
well-structured group, such as a formal corporation with authority
schemes expressly in place, the lawyer’s counseling of a constituent
will approach but not equal the quality of deference the lawyer ought
14 See text accompanying notes 84-85, 115 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 60-82 infra.
16 See text accompanying notes 88-112 infra.
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to pay to her individual client.  Because effective counseling requires a
lawyer to discern and mine the client’s idiosyncratic needs, values, and
degree of comfort with risk, the lawyer fails to serve her client well if
she assumes that those qualities of the constituent are those of the
client itself.  She may presume such a match, but that presumption is a
weak one, or can be in certain circumstances.
Second, when the lawyer works with a loosely-structured group,
such as an informal homeowner’s association with no formal corpo-
rate existence, her responsibilities increase substantially, as do her
risks of getting things wrong, of course.  The Article recognizes that
under the law of lawyering and as a matter of substantive “corporate”
law a lawyer may represent an informal group as an entity, rather than
as a collection of individuals in the form of joint representation.  (The
Article seeks to unpack that distinction with some care, for it is rather
elusive.)  The critical consideration for the lawyer is transparency—to
be certain that the individuals who form the membership within the
loose association understand that the representation is as a group and
not as an aggregation of individuals.  The buy-in of the membership to
the concept of group representation is a necessary (but not a suffi-
cient) precondition to her proceeding on behalf of the entity.  The Ar-
ticle then acknowledges the obligation of the lawyer to obtain from
the unincorporated association a decisionmaking scheme binding
upon the group.  Without that element, the Article concludes, the law-
yer cannot effectively proceed to represent the group.
Once the lawyer has the buy-in from the membership and a con-
sensual scheme by which the lawyer may recognize authority from
certain constituents representing the group’s leadership, the lawyer’s
counseling role resembles that described above in the context of a
well-structured group.  The Article concludes, however, that a loosely-
structured group with a consensual decisionmaking scheme is not a
well-structured group.  As a result, the Article contends, the lawyer’s
deference to the group’s appointed constituents is even less strong
than in the previous context.  The Article draws support for this con-
clusion from two interlocking considerations—respect for the group’s
shared mission (and the lawyer’s effort to achieve accuracy on that
front) and the lawyer’s professional interest in minimizing claims of
malfeasance and breach of fiduciary duty to the group membership.
The two considerations may be different ways of describing the same
thing, but the Article treats them as separate factors warranting sepa-
rate examination.
Understanding the best practices protocols and considerations
when working with the varieties of group clients, while a significant
part of this Article, only serves as the backdrop for the Article’s ar-
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ticulated mission, which is to consider a lawyer’s work with commu-
nity groups.  This Article conceives of a community group in two
guises.  First, it accepts that many community groups possess a public
mission.  Not every group with a public mission is a community group,
nor does every community group have a public mission.  But that
quality is sufficiently central to the role of so many community groups
that the Article examines the responsibilities of lawyers representing
groups with an articulated public mission (such as nonprofits).  It ar-
gues that the mission implies fiduciary-like obligations on the part of
the lawyer, obligations which are less robust in the private arenas.17
Another common conception of “community group” would de-
scribe members of a disadvantaged or under-resourced community
banded together for a common end, even if that end does not qualify
as a charitable or “public” one.  The Article therefore examines sepa-
rately the best practice protocols for lawyers working with groups of
disadvantaged clients, to discern how that fact—the fact of poverty, of
discrimination, or of oppression—alters the representational commit-
ments of the group’s lawyer.  The Article comments on two such com-
mitments emerging from the community lawyering literature.18
The first commitment connects to conceptions of empowerment
and community-building.  The Article’s discussion acknowledges the
strengths of those conceptions, but recognizes the potential, and
sometimes inevitable, tension between successful pursuit of a group’s
public mission and the lawyer’s dedication to group solidarity.  An ef-
fective community lawyer needs to acknowledge that tension and dis-
cern how to accommodate it in her work with the group membership
and its leadership.  Recognition of that tension, in turn, triggers the
second commitment addressed by the Article’s final section.  Some
scholars recommend a more active role for the community lawyer to
make space for a disadvantaged or oppressed community group to lo-
cate the power the group lacks, even if the group leadership or mem-
bership do not yet recognize the need for such space.  The Article
seeks to understand respectfully this set of arguments, and to harmo-
nize its persuasiveness with the overall anti-paternalist strain within
the community lawyering scholarship.  It concludes with a plea for
more textured, practice-driven stories justifying the more activist
stance.  Absent those stories, the activists’ arguments have theoretical
clout, but insufficient practical influence.
17 See text accompanying notes 259-70 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 271-307 infra.
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I. THE BENCHMARK: COUNSELING INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS
This section describes what has emerged as the “default” orienta-
tion to counseling clients—a meeting between a lawyer and her indi-
vidual client to assist with a difficult legal matter regarding that
client’s personal or business affairs, and about which the client must
make an important decision or choice.  It is of some interest that the
one-on-one individual client interaction serves as the baseline model
for this lawyering skill, but that observation is a solid one.19  That de-
fault understanding also tends to address a paradigmatic kind of coun-
seling experience—assisting a client to make a definitive choice
among a finite set of alternatives.20  While a lawyer’s counseling re-
sponsibilities include other kinds of interactions—including, for exam-
ple, offering straightforward advice about what the law is,21 or
assisting a client to develop some authority for the lawyer to use in
negotiations22—those tasks receive less attention in the standard texts,
and they are less relevant for our purposes.
For purposes of both respect and convenience, I will refer to the
default understanding of individual counseling as the “Binder &
Price” model,23 while fully acknowledging that later writers, including
David Binder and Susan Price themselves, have refined the early
thinking about this skill set with tremendous insight and sophistica-
tion.  But the basic conceptions offered by Binder & Price in 1977
remain valid today, even if they have generated considerable rich dis-
19 The pioneering texts on the legal skills of interviewing and counseling tend to use
individual clients as examples for their advice and models, and those examples tend to
cover dispute resolution or litigation matters rather than transactional matters.  The earli-
est and most influential book had that quality. See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 12, at 53-
103.  While the collective understanding of effective counseling has grown in sophistication
since the pathbreaking work of Binder & Price, the prevailing contexts within that litera-
ture continue to focus largely on individual clients with individual legal needs. See, e.g.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13; ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR., JOHN M. A. DIPIPPA,
MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLI-
ENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2d ed. 2006); STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K.
NEWMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIA-
TION, AND PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2007).
20 See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 282 (describing counseling as
comparing identified alternatives); COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 116-17 (same);
KRIEGER & NEWMANN, supra note 19, at 236-54 (same).
21 Lawyers of course often have simply to explain the law to a client in a didactic fash-
ion, even when the client need not use it in a complicated way.  For example, a lawyer
might advise a client about the requirements for a nonprofit corporation to obtain
501(c)(3) status, simply as a list of legal requirements.  While this task is often more chal-
lenging than one might expect, it tends not to be the focus of the more interesting writing
about the counseling process.
22 I have argued that this kind of counseling is far more prevalent, and far more diffi-
cult, than the standard texts admit. See Paul R. Tremblay, Pre-Negotiation Counseling: An
Alternative Model, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006).
23 See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 12.
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cussion about their implications.24
Two aspects of the Binder & Price approach concern us here, the
two which have the most relevance to our comparisons between indi-
vidual counseling and group client counseling.  The first is the funda-
mental commitment to client-centeredness in the counseling process.
The second is the elegance of the proffered structure of an effective
counseling session.  While both of these are quite familiar to those
who teach about and engage in client counseling, they warrant a brief
summary here.
Client-Centeredness:  The Binder & Price approach to the lawyer/
client interaction is expressly “client-centered,” and their client-cen-
tered approach to lawyering has become the “predominant model”
taught in law schools today.25  A client-centered approach to law-
yering respects an individual’s autonomy, and warns against a lawyer’s
interference, either willingly or otherwise, with a client’s full owner-
ship of his legal matter.26  Its basic premise is this:  A lawyer must aim
to assist a client to make choices and to proceed with his legal work in
ways which reflect the client’s preferences, values, goals, and commit-
ments.  It is profoundly anti-paternalist in its philosophy.  It also
makes a good deal of sense.  A lawyer is an agent of a client, who is
the principal in the relationship.  Each lawyer brings to the interaction
her own peculiar set of values, fears, likes and dislikes, and it is wrong,
as a moral measure, for the lawyer, the professional with power and
status, to make choices based upon the lawyer’s preferences instead of
the client’s.27
A commitment to client-centeredness leads Binder & Price to
craft counseling models imbued with neutrality.  To understand why
(and to appreciate the challenges of this stance), we should consider
for a moment the expectation of a client seeking help from a lawyer
on a complicated and serious legal matter.  Imagine that the client has
agreed to pay the lawyer a lot of money for the lawyer’s services.  The
24 See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 717 (1987); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in
Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997); Katherine R. Kruse,
Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L.
REV. 369 (2006) [hereinafter Kruse, Fortress in the Sand].
25 See Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 370.
26 LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 272-75; see Kruse, Fortress in the Sand,
supra note 24, at 373 (noting but critiquing this analysis).
27 This fundamental objection to lawyer control, and its respect for the preferences of
the client, is a well accepted component of client-centered lawyering.  For its early articula-
tion, see BINDER & PRICE, supra note 12, at 147-53; Spiegel, supra note 6; Marcy Strauss,
Toward a Revised Model of the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy,
65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 4 (1975).
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client might expect that for the high prices she charges, the lawyer will
offer direct and definitive advice:  “My expert, considered opinion is
that you should do the following . . . .”  The client-centeredness ap-
proach suggests that the lawyer will seldom provide that kind of direc-
tion to her clients.  Why not?
The reason why not is grounded in what lawyers assist clients to
do.  Suppose that a client wants to know from his lawyer what legal
device will accomplish Goal X, and that only one plausible legal ma-
neuver, Device Z, will accomplish Goal X.  In that case, the lawyer
should and will offer her expert advice:  “We’ll use Device Z.”  But
few legal matters have such straightforward and definitive solutions.
Most legal matters—and virtually all of the legal matters that are in-
teresting and challenging—involve multiple alternative actions, uncer-
tainties about each, assessments of levels of risk, and imperfect
predictions about what some other people are likely to do in the fu-
ture.  A smart and wise lawyer will recognize the relevant alternatives,
describe the inherent uncertainties, offer reliable predictions about
other participants’ likely behaviors, and assess the risk levels.  But
then, once the lawyer has performed her role and communicated all of
that critical information to her client, only the client can choose
among the available alternatives based on factors peculiarly within the
client’s competence.
Perhaps like most of us, many clients will want the lawyer to go
further, and to make the ultimate choices for them.  But, while a law-
yer is well equipped to perform the role just described, she is ill-
equipped to understand what choice meets the client’s needs most fully.
The lawyer may know her client really well, but the odds are that she
does not know the client as well as the client knows himself.  Because
of the risks and uncertainties involved, the “best” decision is the one
which accommodates the client’s preferences, values, and position on
the risk-taking versus risk-avoiding scale.  It is also becoming more
well-accepted that good decisionmaking is far more dependent on
emotion than on reason.28  A choice will be “right” not because of
some reasoned, objective calculus, but because it meets the personal
(and often unconscious29) needs of the person who will live with the
results.
This description is almost embarrassingly oversimplified.  It does
not acknowledge the challenges of adhering to a client-centered ap-
proach in practice with our clients, or our students’ clients.30  It has
28 See JONAH LEHRER, HOW WE DECIDE 34-42 (2008).
29 Id. at 237.
30 Kate Kruse offers one of the more elegant of the critiques of the simplified view of
the neutrality principle. See Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24.  Others question
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not addressed those settings where the above arguments lack analyti-
cal power, such as in cases involving morally unacceptable conduct31
or where the lawyer’s client lacks sufficient capacity to make informed
decisions, either because of a disabling mental or emotional impair-
ment32 or, as some have argued, because of political oppression that
limits autonomous decisionmaking.33  But those considerations aside,
the client-centered approach is fundamentally right, and morally co-
herent.34  Any counseling model or best practice must account for that
whether it inadvertently (or otherwise) privileges dominant cultural habits while overlook-
ing less prevalent practices and patterns of relationships. See Jacobs, supra note 24, at 361-
74; Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book: The Latest Clinical Texts and
a Sketch of a Future Agenda, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 131 (2006).
31 See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 391-93; Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Deborah L. Rhode, Paul R. Tremblay & Thomas L. Shaffer, Symposium: Client Counseling
and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 591 (2003); Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra
note 24, at 431.  Kruse has critiqued client-centeredness for its deafness to moral issues, see
id. at 385, but in doing so she fails to afford the model sufficient credit.  While it may be
true that some of the early descriptions of the model may not have been sufficiently clear,
it is equally evident that deference to client preferences may only be justified when those
preferences are not morally troublesome.  There is nothing paternalistic about a lawyer’s
resisting morally unacceptable schemes, and nothing within the Binder & Price theory
would suggest that a lawyer must withhold judgments on those issues. See Paul R. Trem-
blay, Client-Centered Counseling and Moral Activism, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 615 (2003).
Kruse’s worries about the actual effectiveness of a lawyer’s intervention (and the use of
“moral dialogues”), on the other hand, are quite on target. See Kruse, Fortress in the Sand,
supra note 24, at 431-33.
32 See, e.g., David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WISC. L. REV.
454; Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the
Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515.
33 See Gary Bellow, Steady Work, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 303 (1996) (recom-
mending talking “seriously about purposive judgment—when and whether to intervene or
to seek influence” with clients who are poor); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternal-
ist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and
Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 638 (1982) (discussing “false conscious-
ness” as a possible justification for paternalism).  This Article addresses that argument
below. See text accompanying notes 282-307 infra.
34 As we see below in our discussion of community group counseling (see text accom-
panying notes 286-88 infra), many critical scholars object to the “neutrality” framework
emphasis within the Binder & Price model and its followers, particularly as applied to work
with oppressed clients. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Law-
yering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1099 [hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret] (scholars overstate domina-
tion of clients as an “overwhelming menace”).  Those critics assert that neutrality is a false
conception, because “lawyers will have to take sides” in their work with their clients. Id. at
1102. See also Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 385 (neutrality is a psychologi-
cally flawed conception); Bellow, supra note 33, at 301 (the “practice of law always in-
volves exercising power”).  These critics do not, however, recommend that lawyers should,
as a moral and tactical commitment, dominate their clients and assert their professional
superiority over the clients.  Not surprisingly, the progressive critics actively reject such an
attitude, and urge far greater respect for the wisdom of the non-professional clients. See,
e.g., Alfieri, Practicing Community, supra note 3, at 1750 (“[Progressive lawyers] take peo-
ple’s dignity.  The taking deprives them of the opportunity to demonstrate—in private and
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commitment.  While some adherents of what has come to be known in
some contexts as a “collaborative” model of client representation as-
sert that the arguments for lawyer neutrality are overstated,35 their
arguments continue to embrace a profound respect for the interests
and the preferences of the clients.36
A Model or Structure:  The second ground-breaking contribution
from the first Binder & Price text is its outline of a model for con-
ducting a counseling session.37  While some may quibble about the
propriety of using a model for a complex interactive lawyering experi-
ence such as a client counseling session,38 as a pedagogical tool a
model is a brilliant idea.  The Binder & Price model is not a recipe,
and it is not intended to be slavishly followed by students.39  But its
value as an orienting device to permit students (and, of course, law-
yers) to understand the insights about effective counseling, and to ar-
range their time with their clients in a workable way, is considerable.
Here, we review briefly the basic structure of a Binder & Price coun-
seling session, to understand its underpinning and, later, to adapt it for
a lawyer’s work with a group, or with constituents of a group.
The basic counseling model from Binder & Price seeks to achieve
the following goals:40  The lawyer must appreciate the client’s goals
and needs; the client must understand in as meaningful way as possi-
ble what the available alternatives represent, both objectively (as a
matter of law and fact) and in how each alternative affects that partic-
ular client; the client must appreciate how the alternatives compare to
one another, by exploring the relative advantages and disadvantages
public spheres—their competence as autonomous, self-determining agents . . . [and] denies
communities a crucial element of their solidarity (organization and mobiliza-
tion).”)(emphasis in original).  Even the critics would agree, therefore, that a counseling
model, whether with individual clients, group clients, or community groups, ought to seek
to minimize the inadvertent domination by the lawyer of the client.  In that spirit, and
without rejecting the insights of the progressive critics, this Article proceeds with a baseline
embrace of the neutrality principle.
35 See, e.g., COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (a client-centered model of represen-
tation fails to account for the needs of third parties); Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra
note 24, at 385-95 (client-centered model is too one-dimensional).
36 See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 11-25 (criticizing former lawyer-dominant
practices); Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 421-24 (developing a more
nuanced approach to recognizing and achieving client autonomy).
37 See BINDER & PRICE, supra note 12, at 157-87.
38 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 24, at 355-57 (critiquing the Binder & Price method for
simplification of the complexity of client counseling); Linda Morton, Teaching Creative
Problem-Solving: A Paradigmatic Approach, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 375 (1998); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing From the
MacCrate Report—Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REV.
593, 604-05 (1994); Piomelli, supra note 30, at 179.
39 See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 12-13.
40 Id. at 281-92.
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of the respective options; the lawyer must organize and present the
preceding discussion in a way that does not attempt to influence the
client to choose a result which the lawyer would choose based upon
her own preferences or needs; the lawyer must understand and ac-
count for the heuristics and biases, or “cognitive illusions,”41 which
can distort a client’s “rational” decisionmaking;42 and, finally, the law-
yer must then assist the client to make a choice or a decision that fits
best the client’s comfort with risk, his needs, his preferences, and his
“values.”43
The Binder & Price model aims to achieve those goals by sug-
gesting the following structure of a counseling meeting between the
lawyer and her individual client.44
A paradigmatic meeting might follow this scheme:45
• The lawyer and client review the client’s goals and wishes;
41 For an overview of cognitive illusions, see Persi Diaconis & David Freedman, The
Persistence of Cognitive Illusions, 4 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 317 (1981); Robert E. Scott, Error
and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cog-
nitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 340-42 (1986).
42 Early versions of client counseling models assumed that the lawyer and the client
were economically rational actors seeking to maximize utility.  In recent years both the
lawyering skills community, as well as the greater legal and economic community, have
come to appreciate the insights of the behavioral economists, who demonstrate how “pre-
dictably irrational” individuals tend to be in their decisionmaking. See LAWYERS AS COUN-
SELORS, supra note 13, at 382-91 (discussing the role of cognitive illusions in client
counseling).  For background in the increasingly popular literature on the topic of heuris-
tics and biases, see, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (1st ed. 1982); DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008);
ORI BRAFMAN & ROM BRAFMAN, SWAY: THE IRRESISTIBLE PULL OF IRRATIONAL BEHAV-
IOR (2009); LEHRER, supra note 28; LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK:
HOW RANDOMNESS RULES OUR LIVES (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
43 It is quite common for writers addressing the counseling process to refer to the im-
portance of the client’s “values,” using that term to capture the personal, internal commit-
ments possessed by the client. See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 11-12;
Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1164; Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 415.  In my
previous writing, I have resisted the use of that term, because of its implication that moral
values are personal and idiosyncratic, and therefore essentially ungrounded outside of re-
ligious contexts. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of
Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 680-86 (2002) (arguing that moral values are not personal
and ungrounded).  As I use the tern “values” in this Article, I intend it to mean those
commitments which are essentially idiosyncratic, and not as fundamental moral principles.
44 While the following structure is, once again, not intended as a fixed orchestration
and not a cookbook recipe, it does capture an elegance which makes a great deal of sense
given the goals just identified.
45 This scheme is a simplification of the model developed most recently in LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 281-91.  It is not inconsistent with the counseling advice
contained in other texts, although other texts may rely less on models than Binder & Price
and its successive iterations.
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• The lawyer then briefly describes the available options, suffi-
ciently so to permit the client to elect an order of discussion;
• The client then chooses which option to discuss first, second, and
so forth;46
• The lawyer describes each option separately with great care and
with elaborate detail, in an objective and non-normative fashion,
to enable her client to understand the options and their respec-
tive levels of risk;47
• The lawyer and client engage in a normative, comparative dis-
cussion about the options, systematically and with explicit refer-
ence to advantages (“pros”) and disadvantages (“cons”) of each
option as they apply to the client’s specific circumstances;48 and
finally,
• The client, having understood the relative merits of each choice
and the need to choose one, chooses one, through an active dia-
logue with the lawyer.
If a designer of lawyering protocols were to imagine a rational, value-
maximizing actor wishing to make a deliberative decision in the most
careful and thoughtful fashion, with a full appreciation for the risks
involved and how those risks interact with the actor’s peculiar brand
of risk-taking (or risk-aversion), the designer would be hard pressed
to arrive a better organizational protocol than the Binder & Price
model just described.49
If such a scheme, with its dedication to neutrality and anti-pater-
nalism, and its appreciation for personal risk-taking idiosyncrasy,
46 The rationale for this step and that just preceding it is to minimize the lawyer’s inad-
vertent (or advertent) skewing the decisionmaking process by choosing the order of topic
discussion, signally thereby the lawyer’s value judgments about the options. See id. at 309.
47 As will remain apparent as this Article proceeds, the most important quality, and the
most challenging factor, within a counseling meeting of this type concerns how the client
will manage the relative risks involved in the available choices.  In the paradigmatic cir-
cumstance, each alternative offers to the client some chance of good and some chance of
bad, with the levels of risk, of good, and of bad different within each choice.  The client’s
goal is not simply to choose the option that delivers the highest level of the good; he must
instead grapple with his risk aversion sentiments to decide the types of gambles he is will-
ing to take.  For a discussion of this element of counseling, see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort
& Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal
Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 379 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology
of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 629, 655 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Epistemology] (lawyers are motivated to
overstate legal risk).
48 The counseling texts often note the value of a chart to accomplish the systematic
assessment of the competing alternatives. See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at
236, 320; COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 167-68.
49 The commentators tend to agree with this assessment. See SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFES-
SIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 179-83 (1992) [hereinafter THE
MACCRATE REPORT]; Dinerstein, supra note 24, at 504 (noting “the extraordinary influ-
ence of the model within clinical education circles”).
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works for an individual, value-maximizing actor, how, if at all, should
it be adapted to fit the context of a member, representative, or constit-
uent of an organization or group?  That question serves as the basis
for the remainder of this Article.  To begin the inquiry, we must estab-
lish an understanding of the term “client group.”
II. “GROUP” CLIENTS
We may start by recognizing that the conception of a “group”
client easily separates into two distinct possibilities:  (1) a group client
might refer to a collection of clients whom the lawyer represents in
the same matter—otherwise known in many circles as “joint cli-
ents”;50 and (2) a collection of individuals (or entities51) who under-
stand themselves to constitute a single organization—in other words,
an entity, as commonly understood by Model Rule 1.13.52  The law-
yer’s responsibilities should be substantially different depending upon
which kind of group the lawyer represents.  Every instance of “group”
representation falls into one of those two categories.
It might be the case that one’s initial understanding of the task of
counseling “group clients” would implicate only the former under-
standing, and not the latter, since, of course, an organizational client is
a single client just as any individual person would be.  Indeed, it is
hard to consider a lawyer representing, say, Martha’s Bakery, Inc. as
representing a “group” client.  In fact, for purposes of thinking about
the lawyer’s role as a counselor, the precise opposite understanding
applies.  A lawyer working with multiple individual clients is not coun-
seling a “group client” at all, for the purposes of interest to this
Article.  A lawyer working with an entity, by contrast, is working with
a “group client,” almost all of the time.  Given our ultimate goal of
understanding a lawyer’s responsibility in representing community
groups, this contention is especially true.
The next section examines the differences in the counseling pro-
cess between the two kinds of collective clients, but before we reach
that examination we should add a bit of texture to this definitional
introduction.
Imagine, then, a series of lawyer/client interactions, in the follow-
ing progression:
50 For a discussion of joint client representation, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 128-130 (2002) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Multiple
Representation, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:301-30 (2009).
51 An entity may be a collection of entities. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978) (law firm represented the American
Petroleum Institute, a consortium of energy companies).
52 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, R. 1.13 (2009) [hereinafter “MODEL
RULES”].
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1. Ellen, a lawyer, represents Fred Quinn as a plaintiff in civil ac-
tion involving an automobile accident.  Ellen has one individual cli-
ent, as we all would agree.
2. Ellen represents Fred and Karen Quinn, a married couple about
to purchase a condominium, for purposes of the couple’s real estate
closing.  Ellen now has two individual clients, to each of whom she
owes full fidelity and her other lawyer-generated duties.  There is a
potential conflict of interest between Fred and Karen which Ellen
must recognize and, possibly, address.53  We would likely not under-
stand Ellen as representing the “group” client which this couple
represents, especially since each client has his or her separate iden-
tity and is entitled to his or her separate allegiance from Ellen.54
3. Ellen represents Sullivan, Carchidi, and DiPasquale, defending
each against first-degree murder charges filed against all three.
Even more clearly than in the previous example, Ellen has three
separate clients here, with very substantial potential (if not actual)
conflicts of interest.55  To refer to the three defendant-clients as a
“group” client serves no purpose whatsoever, as Ellen must respect
the rights and interests of each equally (subject to some knowing
waivers by the clients56).
4. Ellen represents Fred and Karen Quinn, along with Evangeline
Olson and Alan McMorrow, all four of whom wish to start and in-
53 A lawyer may represent multiple individual clients in the same matter as long as no
disqualifying conflict of interest exists. MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7.  If the
multiple clients face potential conflicts that might interfere with the attorney’s professional
judgment, the lawyer may still represent the clients, but only after obtaining informed con-
sent. Id. at R. 1.7(b).  The Comments to Rule 1.7 imply that a lawyer must obtain in-
formed consent in every instance of multiple representation, to insure that the clients
understand the benefits of separate representation. Id. at Cmt. [29].  Other authorities
seemingly disagree. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 130, Cmt. c, Illus. 1 (ad-
vising an informed consent discussion only in matters where a plausible potential conflict
exists).
54 The real estate closing example is a useful one to highlight the subtle distinction
between joint and entity representation.  While the statement in the text is true, that each
separate client (here, Fred and Karen) is entitled to seek the assistance of his or her own
lawyer, it is conceptually unclear what a separate lawyer would accomplish in this example,
since the closing is not a divisible event, and the parties’ interests are fully aligned.  (In-
deed, if the parties develop a difference of opinion about a term in the closing, they must
come to some consensus or the transaction, with the couple as buyers, will fail.)  For this
reason, there is some logic in deeming the couple as an entity. Cf. Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 965-66 (1987) (“organic com-
munities [such as a husband and wife dyad] . . .  are prior in life and culture to
individuals”).
55 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (possible conflict of interest among defen-
dants Sullivan, Carchidi, and DiPasquale which, if proven, would violate the defendants’
rights under the Sixth Amendment).
56 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7.  Most authorities discourage joint represen-
tation of criminal defendants in a single prosecution, even if the prospective clients so
choose. See Multiple Representation, Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51:301-30
(2009).
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corporate a new small on-line business, to be known as Eastern Val-
ley Texts, Inc.  Fred and Karen will provide financing and are
looking for an equity share as an investment; Evangeline will pro-
vide the technical expertise and will create the business’s systems,
after investing a little bit of capital; and Alan will operate the busi-
ness but will not invest any initial capital.  Ellen now has four cli-
ents, but surely not a “group client.”  Indeed, because of the
seriously differing interests and varying types of investment of the
four principals of the business, Ellen must recognize and massage
the possible conflicts of interest among them.  Most legal ethics au-
thorities would conclude that Ellen may proceed to represent the
four clients in this setting, with appropriate waivers and consents.57
5. Ellen now represents Eastern Valley Texts, Inc., the Subchapter
S corporation she helped create for Fred, Karen, Evangeline and
Alan, each of whom is now a shareholder and one of whom (Alan)
is now an employee.  Ellen now has just one client—the entity—
which we can consider a “group client,” because the entity consists
of its several constituents and Ellen must attend to the constituents’
interests as reflected in the organizational bylaws and similar docu-
ments.  Of all of the examples we have seen thus far, this example
comes closest to capturing the essence of a group client, instead of
some version of joint representation.58
6. One final example:  Ellen represents the Brooksby Hill Tenants
Association, an unincorporated association of residents living within
a public housing complex in her city.  The group meets regularly
and wants advice about tenant rights and assistance with strategies
to obtain benefits from the housing authority management.  As we
examine more fully below, Ellen as a lawyer may represent an unin-
corporated association, and in doing so she represents it as an en-
tity, subject to Rule 1.13.59  Ellen could, given the fact that this
group is not formally organized, represent a number of tenants sep-
57 See Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992) (joint representation permitted but
after entity formed, constituents lose client status retroactively); Manion v. Nagin, 394 F.3d
1062, 1069 (8th Cir. 2005) (limiting the Danforth doctrine).  For a discussion of both cases,
see D. Ryan Nayar, Almost Clients: A Closer Look at Attorney Responsibility in the Con-
text of Entity Representation, 41 TEX. J. BUS. L. 313 (2006). See also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 50, at § 130 (disagreeing with the Jesse retroactivity principle but allowing the joint
representation of constituents).
58 Note here that Ellen also has four former clients, now that she represents the entity
and does not represent the constituents of the entity.  The ethical authorities of course
advise Ellen to make that distinction clear to the now-constituents. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 52, at R. 1.13(f). But see Jesse v. Danforth, supra note 57 (constituents retroac-
tively deemed non-clients, so no former client implications).
59 Id. at R. 1.13, cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 130; 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZ-
ARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 17.3 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009).  Whether an unin-
corporated association constitutes an entity or a collection of individuals is a complicated
question, which we confront later. See text accompanying notes 115-25 infra.
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arately but jointly (like in most of the earlier examples above), but
her responsibilities would change, especially in her grappling with
potential conflicts of interest.
The taxonomy we have just observed demonstrates that the con-
cept of representing a “group” can only be understood in any mean-
ingful way as representing an entity, rather than representing a
collection of individuals.  The reference has some usefulness in refer-
ring to joint representation as well, but less elegantly so.  Neverthe-
less, the following discussion will necessarily address both types of
multiple representation.
III. COUNSELING GROUP CLIENTS
With the preceding definitional background in place, and with a
reminder of the “baseline” counseling model emerging from the
Binder & Price sources as an appropriate benchmark, this section will
now consider the counseling responsibilities of a lawyer working with
three kinds of group clients: (1) joint clients (even if they may not
properly qualify as a “group”); (2) well-structured entity clients; and
(3) loosely-structured entity clients.  After having done so, Part IV
will extrapolate from what we learn here to uncover the best practices
considerations for working with community groups.
A. Counseling Joint Clients
As we have seen immediately above, a lawyer representing joint
clients really has multiple individual clients.  Given our plan to use the
baseline Binder & Price individual-client model as a benchmark for
comparison, there may not be very much of interest to consider when
we explore how a lawyer ought to work with her multiple individual
clients.  Since the fact of joint representation does not deprive the re-
spective individual clients of any rights within the lawyering relation-
ship relevant to our purposes,60 one might imagine that any counseling
of the clients, whether together in one room or separately, would fol-
low the default Binder & Price model.  In other words, nothing in the
joint representation itself requires the lawyer to alter the goals or the
techniques of individual client counseling.
Understanding that, we ought to address here briefly the chal-
lenges faced by a lawyer when representing multiple individual clients
60 Joint clients do sacrifice some important confidentiality rights that non-joint clients
own.  With rare exceptions, a client jointly represented along with one or more co-clients
cannot expect that any secrets he discloses to the lawyer will remain confidential as to the
remaining co-clients. See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7, cmt. 31; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 50, at §60, Cmt. l.  That limitation on the attorney-client relationship does not
affect the lawyer’s counseling responsibilities, however.
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with separable and potentially differing interests, especially since, as
we shall see later, in some community group settings the lawyer might
need to treat the collectivity as a form of joint representation.61  The
discussion here will be somewhat superficial, however, because the is-
sues covered here are the subject of discussion in the conventional
legal ethics literature.62
The most apt subject for our consideration here is the lawyer’s
preliminary but absolutely essential counseling responsibility—to ad-
vise her clients about the potential conflicts and obtain their informed
consent to the joint representation.63  This task is a paradigmatic
Binder & Price counseling opportunity, with a finite set of alternatives
(retain separate counsel, or accept joint representation) of which each
client must choose only one, and not deciding (that is to say, being too
uncertain or torn to arrive at a decision) means deciding on the “de-
fault” or status quo option, which here would mean separate represen-
tation.64  A lawyer’s counseling meeting would seemingly look like the
meeting described above, with the lawyer being neutral about which
choice the client makes, and orchestrating the conversation to ensure
a full descriptive component before an evaluative or normative
discussion.65
There are two distinctive issues arising in a lawyer’s effort to dis-
cern a client’s informed consent to joint representation, however.
Each warrants brief consideration here before we move on.  The first
issue has to do with whether the ethical obligations of the lawyer re-
quire her to meet separately with each of her potential clients for this
informed consent talk, or whether the counseling may occur more effi-
ciently by meeting with the potential clients together.  The latter is
both far more efficient and, one guesses, standard practice among law-
yers.66  Without probing the question in great depth here (and the
topic perhaps warrants its own separate article67), we can at least ten-
61 See text accompanying notes 77-80 infra.
62 See, e.g., Multiple Representation, supra note 56.
63 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7(c) and Cmts. 29 through 33.
64 Because the lawyer must obtain an affirmative act from her client (a formal waiver of
the potential conflicts) in order to proceed with the joint representation, the default ar-
rangement is separate representation (or no representation).
65 See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
66 As my colleague Judy McMorrow notes, in practice this informed consent interaction
often occurs by means of a letter, with no meeting about it at all.  Conversation with Pro-
fessor Judith McMorrow, February 26, 2010.
67 The topic receives attention in several published sources, usually in the context of
estate planning, a practice field which may trigger its own special conflicts concerns. See,
e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 32 (4th ed. 2006) (known as the ACTEC Commenta-
ries) (“A lawyer may wish to consider meeting with prospective clients separately, which
would give each of them an opportunity to be more candid and, perhaps, reveal potentially
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tatively conclude that neither prevailing legal ethics doctrine nor stra-
tegic wisdom would require separate meetings with each potential co-
client.  While some worry must exist that some subtle (or not-so-sub-
tle) peer pressure could affect the voluntariness of any one potential
client’s decision to waive potential conflicts if made within a group
meeting, that worry diminishes somewhat when one realizes that the
result of the potential client’s deliberation cannot help but be pretty
apparent to the other potential clients, who will know with certainty
whether the joint representation will go forward or not, and whether
the others have waived conflicts or not.68
The second concern relates to, and actually undercuts the previ-
ous response to, the first.  That concern relates to the lawyer’s confi-
dentiality obligations with her co-clients.  It is itself doubly layered.
Let us address the most obvious confidentiality layer first.  The Model
Rules,69 and the doctrine surrounding the Model Rules,70 establish
that co-representation will normally include the understanding that
there will be no secrets within the lawyer/client collectivity, and
among the co-clients.  This understanding emerges from the estab-
lished doctrine within the attorney-client privilege71 but also from the
lawyer’s obligations to each client under Rule 1.4 to keep her clients
reasonably informed about developments material to the representa-
tion.72  If the lawyer’s counseling role were simply to announce to her
clients that this concession is a necessary and inevitable by-product of
joint representation (and therefore likely a disadvantage, a “con,” to
serious conflicts of interest or objectives that would not otherwise be disclosed.”); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband and Wife, 20 PROB. LAW.
1, 23 (1994) (“[I]f a multiple representation is being considered separate interviews should
be held with each client, more than once if necessary.  Separate interviews can reveal diver-
gences in the clients’ respective assumptions and purposes that otherwise would be masked
by polite conversation.”).
68 The explanation in the text is actually rather oversimplified, which again suggests the
need for a separate treatment of this issue beyond what we may address here.  If the lawyer
needs to obtain informed consent to co-representation from two potential clients, then the
reasoning in the text applies perfectly—each person will know which way the other has
decided even if the counseling meetings are held separately and in private.  But if the
group of potential co-clients is three or more, that conclusion does not follow.  None of the
three will know which of the other two did not agree to joint representation if the lawyer
does not obtain unanimity to the waivers.
69 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7 cmt. 31.
70 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §60; RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE §1.6-9, 262-64 (2008-
09).
71 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §75, Cmt. d; State v. Cascone, 487 A.2d
186, 189 (Conn. 1985); Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579
N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991); Ashcraft & Gerel v. Shaw, 728 A.2d 798 (Md. App. 1999).
72 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.4; A v. B. v. Hill Wallack, 726 A.2d 924 (N.J.
1999)(concluding that Rule 1.4 duties must be enforced even over objection of a co-client,
because complaining co-client had warnings about shared secrets).
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the idea of a joint endeavor), it would be of some interest but little
more than that.  In fact, however, the concession is neither inevitable
nor necessary.  It is a choice to be made by each prospective client.73
While no doubt awkward in practice, the lawyer and her co-clients
possess the right according to the substantive law of lawyering to opt
not to share with one another all confidential information passing
through the lawyer.  Such an agreement will preserve the privilege
waiver implications in the case of a later dispute between some co-
clients,74 just as it contractually limits the lawyer’s obligations under
Rule 1.4 and permits the lawyer to withhold otherwise material infor-
mation from some of her clients.75
For our purposes, this insight complicates the lawyer’s counseling
strategy, and might influence whether she may perform her disclosure
duties to the group as a whole.  A competent informed consent discus-
sion must address this issue with each affected prospective client.
Each prospective client must have the lawyer’s wise judgment about
whether that client has information which ought not be shared with
the others.76  The lawyer would be a more effective counselor to each
prospective client if she could have that discussion outside of the ear-
shot of the other potential co-client.
That concern is what was described a moment ago as the first of
the two confidentiality layers.  The second layer becomes apparent
now, given our assessment of the lawyer’s efforts to obtain intelligent,
informed consent to the confidentiality waiver.  While the lawyer is
negotiating the contours of her relationships with the prospective cli-
ents (and potential co-clients), those preliminary conversations have
their own confidentiality implications which the lawyer and her pro-
spective clients must appreciate.  Even if each prospective client opted
not to retain the lawyer after the lawyer has explored the possible
conflicts waivers, the discussions about whether to retain the lawyer
are fully covered by the confidentiality protections of Rule 1.6.77
Therefore, were the lawyer, in an explicit effort to be the best coun-
selor to each person about whether that person would choose to waive
73 MODEL RULES, supra note 50, at R. 1.7, Cmt. 31; ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra
note 70, at § 1.6-9.
74 RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §75, Cmt. d.
75 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.7, Cmt. 31.
76 The example used in the legal ethics literature—the question of trade secrets—clev-
erly eludes this worry. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §60, Cmt. l; MODEL RULES,
supra note 52, at R. 1.7, Cmt. 31.   One can easily imagine a lawyer working with two
aligned but also competitor companies, where each would agree in front of the other that
the lawyer will not reveal the respective client’s trade secrets to the other.  The fact of
some valuable but extremely confidential information is not itself something to be kept
from the other co-client.
77 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.18(b).
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confidentiality and to waive any other potential conflicts, to decide to
meet separately with each person, all of her successive conversations
would be imbued with the cloak of secrecy.  The resulting constraint
might then impair the lawyer’s later representation of any client who
chose to stay with the lawyer.78  More importantly, that reality might
impair the lawyer’s effectiveness in the next discussion with the next
prospective co-client about whether to waive confidentiality and any
possible conflicts of interest.79
Given these two layers of concern, the lawyer might conclude
that her most prudent posture is to meet with her prospective co-cli-
ents together, and not alone, to counsel them as best she can while
remaining fully generic in her description of the risks involved.  For
example, recall Ellen, who represents Fred and Karen Quinn, along
with Evangeline Olson and Alan McMorrow, all four of whom wish to
start and incorporate a new small on-line business, to be known as
Eastern Valley Texts, Inc.80  A sample of how Ellen might describe her
mission to the four individuals might proceed something like this:
I would love to represent the four of you on this project.  In so
many ways, it makes sense for you four as a group to choose one
lawyer—me, or someone else—to assist you to decide whether to
create an organization and, if so, what kind of structure to use.  But
before we talk about your retaining me, though, I have a very im-
78 It is not at all inconceivable that the co-clients would decline joint representation
after the lawyer’s informed consent discussion (any one of them has a veto, of course), and
that one of the group would choose the lawyer to serve as his sole counsel thereafter. See,
e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 541, 554-
55 (1997).  The concern in the text addresses whether in-depth, separate, serial meetings
with each prospective client might impair the lawyer’s ability to accept the single client
representation.
79 This worry is easily imagined.  Say that our lawyer meets with prospective client #1
(within a group of three), and explores in great depth whether he ought to consent to the
joint representation.  The lawyer meets with him alone in order to be more useful to him in
making this difficult choice, so he is not constrained by the presence of the other two in
thinking through his worries.  The special consideration that the lawyer offers to this indi-
vidual increases the chances that she would learn some valuable information that, even if
he does not see it as a worry as to his other two potential co-clients, might turn out to have
some important implication for Client #2 when the lawyer meets with him.  Having heard
the information from Client #1, and not having obtained any informed waivers yet from any
of them (indeed, that is what she is working on), the lawyer may be hobbled in her ability
to assist Client #2 in his deliberation, because she knows information which might affect
Client #2’s thinking, but she cannot share that information with Client #2 until she has
permission from Client #1, permission she cannot obtain until she has completed her serial
meetings.  In this respect the lawyer may find herself in the dilemma explored often among
estate planning lawyers concerning common representation of husbands and wives. See,
e.g., Shaffer, supra note 54 (describing a lawyer representing both husband and wife who
learns a damaging fact from the husband who wishes to keep that fact from the wife); NY
State Bar Ethics Op. 55 (similar facts; concluding that the lawyer’s confidentiality duty to
the husband outweighs her duty to inform the wife).
80 See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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portant job to do.
I need to explain to you a couple of critical things about what it
means if I, as a single lawyer, represented you, as four separate indi-
viduals, on this common matter.  I need to help you understand that
you have a choice of each hiring your own lawyer to best protect
your own rights.  There may be good reasons to consider that option
of separate lawyers, but there also may be important reasons why
you would not wish to do that.  The reason I raise that possibility is
that, as I will explain, you have interests among you in this business
deal that are not identical.  You come to the project with diverse
kinds of investments and different roles to play.  We’ll have to talk
about those investments and roles, as you decide whether you want
to have one lawyer to represent all of you even though your inter-
ests are not perfectly aligned.  I believe we’ll conclude that it’s en-
tirely proper for you to choose to have one lawyer for all of you, if
that’s what you want.
I also need to explain to you what it means for me to have four
joint clients in terms of the information you give me, and how much
of that I will share with the others in the group.  By sharing a lawyer
you will get less of a complete confidentiality promise from me—
but just as to one another, and not as to anyone else—compared to
your having your own individual lawyers.  My job is to make sure
you understand how that will work, and I’ll explain it more fully in a
minute.
And before we actually start talking about this in more detail, I
need to explain one more introductory matter to you.  My intention
is not to meet with each of you separately as we decide whether you
want to go with one lawyer or go with four.  Until we decide what
my role is, and whom I will represent, I can’t start to interview each
of you separately, because you might tell me something that affects
my separate conversation with one of the others.  You are entirely
free to be as open and honest among each other as you wish in this
room, and nothing you say here leaves this room, unless I start to
hear about some immediate plan by one of you to go out and hurt
someone real bad—and of course that’s not going to happen.81  So
we’ll work as a group while we decide whether you want a lawyer as
a group.  Does that make sense to you?
This conversation captures the lawyer’s responsibility, at least
preliminarily, for seeking informed consent to multiple representa-
81 Note how the lawyer promises complete confidentiality, but acknowledges the exis-
tence of exceptions.  This issue is a fascinating one for students and lawyers alike.  For a
discussion of the issue, see, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 106-07; Clark
D. Cunningham, How to Explain Confidentiality?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 579 (2003); Lee A.
Pizzimenti, The Lawyer’s Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 29 CATH.
U. L. REV. 441 (1990).
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tion.82  If some representation of community groups involves not en-
tity representation but joint representation, as seems quite likely,83 the
lawyer working with the group must engage in some version of this
conversation with those members of the community group who the
lawyer understands will serve as formal clients.
B. Counseling Well-Structured Group Clients
As we noted above, the concept of joint (but still individual-
ized84) representation might qualify as the representation of a group,
but more sensibly the latter would invoke the idea of representing the
group qua group.  While a collectivity may have an identity that
makes the entity theory a coherent possibility, it of course does not
have an intrinsic means of expressing itself.  The lawyer representing
the collectivity must discern how to gauge the intentions of the client
in order to accomplish her purposes.85
Many group clients will have explicit and rigorous schemes in
place for expressing the desires of the organization, and for making
and implementing decisions.  This subsection examines the responsi-
bilities of a lawyer when working with that very typical type of cli-
ent—typical, at least, outside of the community group context.
The question before us in this context might be summarized as
follows:  When a lawyer counsels a legitimate, authorized constituent
82 See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 70, at § 1.7-2(d) (discussing the require-
ments for proper joint representation).
83 Some examples from the literature on community lawyering show groups which ap-
pear to be loosely combined collections of individual clients. See, e.g., Bennett, Embracing
the Ill-Structured Problem, supra note 9, at 58; Piomelli, supra note 1, at 401-02 (environ-
mental justice story in which a lawyer represents three community members who partner
with other residents as the story later develops).  Indeed, Michael Diamond and Aaron
O’Toole argue that the fluidity of community groups may be essential to their character, so
that imposing the constraints of Rule 1.13’s bureaucratic sensibility is harmful to the law-
yer’s work with such groups. See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 523-24.
84 The legal ethics literature tends to refer to the joint representation as “aggregate,” to
distinguish that work from the conception adopted by the drafters of the Model Rules,
which the literature refers to as the “entity” theory. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59,
at § 17-3.
85 This counseling question is a variation of the central ethical challenge faced by any
corporate counsel—how to represent the entity through its “duly authorized constituents.”
While that question understandably has received considerable scholarly attention, scholars
continue to struggle with the concept, and few if any address the quality of the actual
interactions between the lawyer and her client’s agents.  For a sampling of the literature,
see, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: To-
ward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989); Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties
of Attorneys to “Non-Clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity
Representation and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 687-95
(1994); William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?:
An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L. REV. 57 (2003); Note, An Expectations Ap-
proach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1993).
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of an entity, do the lawyer’s responsibilities differ in any way from her
working with an individual client (like, again, a woman in the middle
of a contested divorce)?  The answer to that question appears to be
yes.  The lawyer’s role does differ, in a subtle but possibly important
way.  Given the goals of effective client counseling identified above,86
the entity’s agent is not necessarily entitled to the same level of defer-
ence from the lawyer as the individual client in the divorce matter.
This conclusion will be especially apparent in circumstances of inter-
nal organizational disagreement, of course, but it need not be that nar-
row.  It will hold true even in conventional counseling interactions.
Since any corporation, whatever its size, could qualify as a well-
structured group client, we could use General Electric or Harvard
University as the focus for our discussion, for the principles we discern
here would apply equally to that large corporate setting.  Instead, let
us imagine an energetic, high-functioning community development
corporation as our example.  Consider the Montrose Community De-
velopment Corporation (MCDC), a fictional neighborhood organiza-
tion in Massachusetts.87  Imagine that MCDC has a five-member
board of directors, an executive director, several employees with de-
fined roles (Director of Asset Building Programs, Director of Finance,
Director of Community Organizing, etc.), and the usual collection of
interns and volunteers which populate a community development cor-
poration.  Imagine that the MCDC has retained a lawyer, Dan Shaikh,
to represent it in a sale of an affordable condominium to a first-time
home buyer.  That representation involves some regular counseling
about legal issues that arise in the course of this real estate transac-
tion.  Assume for our purposes that Dan’s primary contact for his le-
gal work is Mercedes Rodriguez, the Director of Asset Building
Programs at MCDC.
Mercedes, of course, is not Dan’s client; MCDC is Dan’s client.88
The first question for our purposes is whether Dan may treat Merce-
des as his client for all counseling purposes—so that, essentially, coun-
seling MCDC would be exactly the same as counseling one of Dan’s
individual clients, as Dan was taught in his law school clinic, applying
the Binder & Price model of careful counseling.  The answer to that
question will be “pretty much so, but not perfectly so.”  Of course,
Dan must be certain that Mercedes has authority to speak for MCDC,
and in his usual day-to-day work Dan would be sufficiently confident
86 See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
87 MCDC has appeared in the past. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Non-
lawyer Practice Within Law Firms, 85 IND. L.J. 653, 662-63 (2009).
88 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.3.
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that he has such actual or apparent authority.89
Assuming that Dan has adequate actual authority to work with
Mercedes in this transaction, let us focus on a more pointed counsel-
ing moment.  Assume the following development:
The real estate closing has been scheduled, and the buyers, a
young Guatemalan couple, have given a $3,000 deposit when they
signed the purchase and sale agreement (known as a P&S90).  That
P&S says that the buyers will forfeit the deposit (and MCDC will
get to retain it) if the buyers do not go through with the sale on the
appointed closing date, subject to some reasonable exceptions.  The
buyers have encountered some difficulty with the bank which they
expected would provide their mortgage, and they need a 30-day ex-
tension of the closing date.  They may or may not have a legal right
to that extension; much turns on the content of some informal con-
versations between MCDC staff and the buyers about the flexibility
of the closing date.
Dan’s role is to counsel Mercedes about whether to enforce the
language of the P&S and retain the $3,000 deposit.  This is a typical
legal counseling matter—there is some chance that the buyers
would win any lawsuit regarding the deposit, but some chance that
the P&S’s literal provisions would prevail in the end.  There is some
uncertainty about how quickly MCDC could locate a replacement
buyer, so permitting the extension would reduce that risk.  Dan’s
client would have the legal right to allow the extension, or to refuse
the extension and claim the deposit, subject to the buyers’ possible
lawsuit to obtain its return.
The conventional counseling literature would offer Dan a sensi-
89 In fact, the aside in the text about Dan’s clarity about Mercedes’s authority masks a
more slippery issue in practice, one that we may only note here and move on.  Even if
Dan’s retainer agreement were signed by the Executive Director of MCDC (and that for-
mality is not necessary under accepted corporate and agency law; see, e.g., Searle v. Cayuga
Medical Center at Ithaca, 813 N.Y.S.2d 552 (hospital may be liable to patient for medical
malpractice due to apparent authority); Town Center Shopping Center, LLC v. Premier
Mortg. Funding, Inc. 148 P.3d 565 (Kan.App. 2006) (corporate tenant responsible for ex-
penses due to landlord under lease agreement resulting from employee’s signature of a
lease)), Dan will likely work pretty exclusively with Mercedes and others with less author-
ity in the organization during Dan’s day-to-day work with her.  Whether Mercedes has
actual (as opposed to apparent) authority for the multitude of decisions she will make with
Dan is at least uncertain.  As long as he possesses apparent authority, though, Dan
breaches no professional duties, which makes a lot of pragmatic sense. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2009):
Apparent authority is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a princi-
pal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the
actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the
principal’s manifestations.
See also Shimko v. Guenther, 505 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2007) (attorney should have
known that limited partner was not general partner; claim for apparent authority denied).
90 See Unif. Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, 14 U.L.A. 689 (2005) (governing purchase
and sales agreements for real estate and adopted in several states).
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ble structure for assisting Mercedes to make this decision.  It is a rela-
tively uncluttered counseling matter—there are two discrete options
(grant the extension, or refuse to grant the extension), and both legal
and non-legal considerations affect the likely outcomes of each choice.
If this were Mercedes’s choice as an individual, Dan would engage her
with a goal of educating her about the nature of each option, discern-
ing her interests and risk-aversion, and guiding her to make the best
decision possible, so that in the end she has a minimum of regret
about the decision she chooses.  Does his counseling of Mercedes as a
constituent change any of that?
It might.  The reason it might has to do with the assessment of
risk, and the appreciation of risk aversion.  Virtually everything within
the counseling process connects to decisions under uncertainty, and
the appreciation for risk.91  Of course, as we noted earlier,92 some
counseling is straightforward didactic narrative—“You must file this
paper in that office by the following deadline.”  But that kind of law-
yer/client interaction is neither interesting nor challenging.  The inter-
esting and challenging counseling involves making choices, and the
choices involve predictions, uncertainty, and risk, and the deci-
sionmaker’s comfort with the uncertainty and risk.  The client-cen-
tered philosophy of counseling assigns to the lawyer the role of
ascertaining and systematizing the predictions and the uncertainties,
and assigns to the client the role of taking, or not taking, the risks.93
The reason the client must assume the latter role is that it is the cli-
ent’s risk-aversion that matters.  The lawyer might have different risk-
aversion qualities, and it is quite easy, and natural, for the lawyer to
assume (even in utmost good faith) that the risk aversion he feels
must be similar to what his client feels.  The client-centered model of
counseling insists that the lawyer not make that mistake.  It expressly
divides the role of description from the role of evaluation.94
When Dan and Mercedes meet, Dan will describe the risks and
91 Client decisionmaking requires an appreciation for risk-taking, see G. NICHOLAS
HERMAN, JEAN M. CARY & JOSEPH E. KENNEDY, LEGAL COUNSELING AND NEGOTIAT-
ING: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 157-63 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing risk aversion in the coun-
seling process); Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43; Karl Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our
Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243, 1253 (1938) (noting the desire for certainty in
law but its elusiveness), and for psychological comfort in face of uncertainty, see Adam J.
Hirsch & Gregory Mitchell, Law and Proximity, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559 (“the psy-
chological ramifications of proximity”); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions,
Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002).
92 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
93 See, e.g. LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 7-8.  For an early recognition of
this insight, see Spiegel, supra note 6, at 73-76.
94 See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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uncertainties, and his training has taught him to defer to Mercedes in
evaluating whether the risks are worth taking.  But, just as Dan’s risk
aversion may be different from Mercedes’s, Mercedes’s risk aversion
may be different from others within the MCDC.  While Dan must as-
sume that Mercedes speaks faithfully for the MCDC on this important
risk-focused consideration, and defer to her in the fashion that the
client-centered model would suggest, the quality of his deference
ought to be different, and less, than if Mercedes were the client her-
self.  Let us explore why this is so.
Dan recognizes that MCDC has appointed Mercedes to serve as
its agent for purposes of this legal consultation.  The authority struc-
ture within MCDC has delegated to Mercedes the responsibility for
making choices like this, with knowledge of her quality of judgment
and her personality.  If MCDC possesses an unfettered right, just like
Dan’s individual clients, to choose to take high-risk or low-risk actions
in the course of its business (or to act as rashly as the client wishes to
act within the bounds of the law95), Dan will then accept Mercedes’s
assessment of the risks and her preferences during the counseling pro-
cess.  (In fact, MCDC may not have the same license to make rash
decisions as an individual client would, because it qualifies as a com-
munity group, and that designation will serve as a constraint on the
client’s discretion as we shall see later.96)
But he may do so in a fashion somewhat less neutral than the
conventional counseling models would prescribe for individual clients.
The importance of neutrality, of course, is to protect against Dan’s
“imposing”97 upon his presumably less sophisticated clients his risk-
95 The rich literature exploring the role responsibilities of lawyers (and other profes-
sionals) working with impaired clients has developed an appreciation for the client’s auton-
omy right to make foolish, if lawful, choices. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 32, at 462-65; Jan
E. Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in the Face of Competing
Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1818, 1844 (1992) (questioning whether guardianship laws ought to inter-
fere with the right to make unwise decisions); Robert Roca & Thomas Finucane, Physi-
cians and Guardianship: A Brief Commentary, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 239, 242
(1996) (guardianship not appropriate for an individual who is “simply an eccentric person
making unusual, unpopular, or unwise choices”).
96 See text accompanying note 172 infra.
97 The worry identified in the literature on the proper engagement between lawyer and
client is that the lawyer, as expert with power, will dominate his client.  For an early expres-
sion of this worry, see Wasserstrom, supra note 27, at 16-18; for more recent discussion,
see, for example, Anthony V. Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity, 121 HARV. L. REV 805, 832
(2007) [hereinafter Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity] (criticizing the “domineering” traits
within regnant lawyering); Piomelli, supra note 1, at 454-55 (observing the critical trends
counter to the lawyer-dominant model).  That worry is similar to, but analytically distinct
from, a pervasive concern within professionalism studies about “imposing values.”  The
proscription on imposing value judgments is extremely common. See, e.g., Dinerstein,
supra note 24, at 156 (criticizing a scholar’s encouragement of lawyers’ “imposing values”
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taking valence, which from an ethical standpoint would be a regretta-
ble result.  That fear exists with Mercedes, of course.  But Dan owes
MCDC a special responsibility to make sure that its important deci-
sions are made intentionally, with a full appreciation by the organiza-
tion of the risks involved.98  While Mercedes is indeed MCDC’s agent,
and MCDC has (either actually or implicitly) delegated to her the
power to make this decision, Dan cannot simply assume that the dele-
gation process is a perfect one.99  Dan has, in essence, an epistemology
problem.  He wonders about the match between Mercedes’s risk toler-
ance and MCDC’s risk tolerance in a way that he need not with an
individual client.
We now see how Dan’s conversation with Mercedes might change
as a result of her being a constituent.  Dan has the responsibility to
attend to the accuracy of Mercedes’s judgments about the corporate
risk-aversion.  He may inquire with Mercedes not just about how well
she appreciates the risks, but whether her assessments about taking
the risks are reflective of those with whom, and for whom, she works.
This is especially true when (and this will be the case most of the time)
the risks implicate the good will, the resources, or the mission of the
organization.
Imagine, then, a conversation with Mercedes, following upon a
version of the prior one above:
Let me summarize where we are right now.  You’ve got a great
understanding of and appreciation for the choices before us, and the
risks that each entails.  And I’m hearing from you pretty clearly that
you prefer to take the more aggressive stance, and cancel the clos-
ing and keep the buyers’ deposit.  As I’ve told you, that’s an entirely
on clients); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 841, 866 (2002) (“My students often express concern with lawyers ‘imposing their
values’ on clients.”).  It is also uniform, in that virtually no observer argues that teachers or
professionals should impose their values upon their students or clients.  But, as I described
above, the concept of value imposition is not entirely a coherent one, implying, as it does,
that value judgments are somehow subjective and personal. See Tremblay, supra note 22,
at 680-86; text accompanying note 27 supra.  For our present purposes, the imposition
worry is more legitimate, because, unlike questions of moral sensibility, willingness to incur
risk is essentially subjective, and the lawyer has no argument that his risk aversion scale
ought to be shared by his clients.
98 As Kate Kruse writes, “Lawyers in the corporate context can serve a similar function
of checking the sometimes unrealistic optimism that tends to pervade business and corpo-
rate culture by raising pragmatic concerns based on measured and risk-averse assessments
about the long-term consequences of proposed decisions.”  Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond
Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 150 (2010).  The “unreal-
istic optimism,” of course, belongs to the constituents, not to the entity.
99 As Judy McMorrow points out to me, the imperfection may result from a number of
sources.  Agents misread their principal’s interests.  Those interests shift over time.  Agents
have their own interests which might affect their perceptions.  Agents succumb to moral
hazard influences.  And so on.  Conversation with Judith McMorrow, February 26, 2010.
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lawful and available option.  MCDC would be fully within its rights
to do it.  But here’s an interesting angle we need to cover next:  I
need to be sure that MCDC as an agency wants to take this aggres-
sive stance.  Again, it has every right to do so, and I’d happily assist
in getting this done and defending the agency after its does so.  But
I need to be sure that it’s not just Mercedes, but MCDC, that wants
this.  Let’s talk about why you see this as the way that the agency
would want to go.  Have you spoken to P.D. Twesigye, your execu-
tive director, about her feelings regarding tactics like this?100
One further issue deserves examination here, before moving on
to a different version of group client counseling.  If it is true that Dan
owes to Mercedes somewhat less deference because of her status as a
constituent, and therefore will play a more active and directive role in
his counseling conversations with her, the question becomes what Dan
ought to rely upon to inform his greater directiveness in that relation-
ship.101  If Dan is not relying on Mercedes as the source of his wisdom
about what the agency should do, on what should he rely?102  Is this
revisionist model of constituent counseling suggesting a form of pater-
nalism and lawyer control for lawyers representing organizations?
Dan has no greater moral or strategic right to act in a paternalis-
tic fashion with MCDC than he would with his individual client in a
divorce.103  At least with private organizations,104 Dan owes his orga-
100 A few readers of an earlier (and perhaps starker) version of this conversation have
noted the worry that Mercedes would not take kindly to this kind of second-guessing.  If
that is a reliable observation, the question becomes whether that consequence trumps
Dan’s need to ensure that he satisfies the interests of his client.  Dan has two (sometimes)
competing duties—to represent his client’s interests in the best manner possible, and to
work comfortably and productively with the client’s constituents.  In balancing those du-
ties, Dan will exercise his practical judgments, appreciating the specific factual context of
any given interaction, to discern whether, and how much, to inquire about the constituent’s
fiduciary accuracy.
101 Note that Dan would likely not second-guess or press Mercedes if she opted for the
less risky alternative.  It was the aggressive stance that triggered Dan’s gentle interven-
tions.  If that is so, Dan may be exhibiting a practice identified by Sue Bryant and Jean Koh
Peters in their exploration of cultural differences within lawyering—the tendency to in-
quire more about matters which are different from what the lawyer would have done. See
Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering, in RACE, CUL-
TURE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 47, 52-53 (Kimberly Barrett & William George eds., 2004).
In this setting, the seeming double standard may in fact be justified.  It is consistent with
ethical judgments in the medical field about paternalistic interventions with questionably
competent persons. See, e.g., Loren H. Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles W. Lidz, Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 282-83 (1977) (paternalist
intervention more justified when patient choice creates high risk of harm).
102 I thank the participants of the UCLA/BYU Conference for pressing this issue.
103 For purposes of this discussion, I accept as a given that paternalism, at least in its
“crude” sense, is not a proper basis for a lawyer’s decisionmaking with a client possessing
decisional competence. See William Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.
Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 224 (1991) (making the distinction between crude and
refined paternalism); Mark Spiegel, The Case of Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Au-
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nizational client precisely the same respect for its autonomy as he
owes to his divorce client.105  Dan’s greater directiveness springs not
from a professional conception that Dan knows better than the con-
stituents what is best for the organization, but instead from two
sources.  First, as the example just above hinted at, Dan has a duty to
test whether the constituent with whom he happens to be meeting ac-
curately represents the preferences of the entity.  That duty is uncon-
nected, conceptually, from Dan’s personal knowledge of and exposure
to the entity’s functioning.  His questioning does not imply any disre-
spect for nor does it intend to raise doubts about the constituent’s
fidelity to or competence within the organization.  As a lawyer, Dan
simply needs to be sure that the choices he will respect belong to the
entity.106
Second, Dan might himself be a source of expertise about the
organization’s preferences, and he may rely upon that expertise to
complement that of the constituent.107  This reality reflects a discrete
dissimilarity from Dan’s role with an individual client.  The conven-
tional neutral posture of a lawyer working with an individual stems
from both the lawyer’s moral duty to respect the preferences of the
client, plus the realization that the lawyer lacks expertise to identify or
unearth those preferences.108  If one central goal of a counseling ses-
sion is to arrive at a decision which bests satisfies the client’s needs
and preferences, a lawyer can never know as well as the client what
those needs and, especially, preferences are.109  The neutral stance is
tonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REV. 307, 320 (critiquing Simon’s
distinctions).
104 The term “private” can mean one of two things, and each supports the argument
made in the text.  If the organization is privately-owned and not publicly traded, then
Dan’s deference to its owners/managers is greater than it ought to be if the organization
has shareholders. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Coun-
sel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 998-99 (2005).  Similarly, if the organization
has a public (as opposed to a private) mission, Dan’s responsibility to respect that mission
would change the assertions made in the text.
105 Whether Dan’s role with a community group is different is a question we take up
later. See text accompanying notes 195-96 infra.  While MCDC is a nonprofit organization
and thus qualifies as a community group, for now we shall ignore that factor.
106 In this respect Dan finds himself in the role of any corporate lawyer with duties to an
entity and not to its constituents or managers. See generally, MILTON C. REGAN, JR. &
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND CORPORATE PRACTICE 76-96 (2005).
107 This observation is consistent with William Simon’s arguments supporting corporate
lawyers’ discretionary judgments about an organization’s “framework of dealing” as the
most faithful avenue of satisfying the entity’s, rather than any particular constituents’, in-
terests. See Simon, supra note 85, at 86-101.
108 See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 368-69.
109 Id. See also Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative
in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 516-17 (1994) (“critical lawyers see the client’s story
as the only story worth telling”; lawyer should not presume to succeed in translating that
narrative).  Even the “collaborative model” theorists accept some limits on the lawyer’s
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grounded in large part on what is essentially an epistemological in-
sight, that the lawyer cannot know the things necessary for making the
best decision.
That epistemological limitation simply is not as prevalent when
the lawyer’s client is a group client.  Put another way, the epistemo-
logical challenge is a quite different one.  With an individual client
(say, the wife in the divorce matter), she may have great difficulty
discerning what she wants to do,110 but in the end only she can make
that judgment in anything close to a reliable or sensible way.111  With
an organizational client, while it also may have great difficulty discern-
ing what it wishes to do, its process of discernment is more open to
examination and input.  When Dan works with Mercedes to make a
hard choice about the deposit, she presumably has reliable and sophis-
ticated institutional knowledge, but Dan may have his own knowledge
base which may properly inform the counseling discussion.  Indeed, in
some settings the lawyer may have a much richer familiarity with or-
ganizational culture and history than a relatively new constituent.  The
point is that nothing in the strategic and ethical considerations gov-
erning effective counseling requires Dan to refrain from engaging in
the process as a constituent himself, other than the important prophy-
lactic worry about possible conflict of interest.112
C. Counseling Loosely-Structured Group Clients
1. Representation of a Loosely-Structured Group
It is not uncommon for a community group to consist of a collec-
understanding of the client’s unique personal story. See, e.g., COCHRAN ET AL., supra note
19, at 20-25 (warning of the risks of lawyer translation).
110 The interviewing and counseling scholarship respects an individual client’s moral
right to make choices about the direction of her life, but that literature does not pretend
that individual clients find that task to be an easy one.  Indeed, it can be frightfully difficult.
See, e.g., John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315,
1357 (2003) (“[e]mpirical research indicates that many clients do have difficulty making
decisions”); Spiegel, supra note 103, at 308 (“individual clients frequently have difficulty
making decisions”).
111 One sensible way might be for her to delegate the decision to her lawyer, simply as a
way to resolve some irreparable uncertainty.  That choice, though, remains hers and hers
alone.
112 As Mark Spiegel observed in his early work on informed consent in the legal profes-
sion, one powerful ethical argument in favor of the lawyer’s respecting the client’s choices
in a neutral way is the concern for conflict of interest. See Spiegel, supra note 6, at 123.
The lawyer’s interests often diverge from the client’s interests in the course of representa-
tion, and informed consent and client-centered counseling together play a prophylactic role
in limiting the lawyer’s inadvertently influencing a client based upon what is more impor-
tant to the lawyer. Id., at 72-74.  By recognizing, as this Article does, a less agnostic role
for the lawyer representing an organization, the conflicts worry reappears.
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tion of concerned individuals who have not (yet) organized them-
selves into a structured corporation or similar entity.113  We need to
consider how a lawyer ought to work with such a group, especially as
she considers her counseling responsibilities.  Our review of this sub-
ject may be divided into two components.  First, in this section, we
consider the implications of establishing an attorney-client relation-
ship with a group which does not possess a preexisting organizational
structure.  Then, in the following section, we review the counseling
responsibilities of a lawyer working with such a group client.
The first question we confront—and it is a critical one—is
whether a lawyer may represent a loosely-structured group, and enter
into an attorney-client relationship with that group.  Given, as we con-
cluded above, that a lawyer may only represent a group either via a
joint representation model or an entity representation model, it is es-
sential to understand whether an unstructured, unincorporated collec-
tion of persons—aside from those who see themselves as a gathering
of discrete if affiliated individuals—could serve as an “entity,” for at-
torney representation purposes, without the presence of a formal or-
ganizational structure.  This question is especially important in the
community group context.  If the entity representation model is not
available with loosely-structured collectivities, then the lawyers work-
ing with such groups are left with the joint representation model.
That latter model, as the preceding discussion showed and as later
discussion here will amplify, is not well suited to the goals sought by
community lawyers.114
The authorities are not at all clear regarding the legal status,
within the attorney-client relationship, of a loosely-structured group,
and the community lawyering literature has thus far elided this ques-
tion.115  The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers in-
113 See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1162 (noting that Ellmann’s analysis concerns
“relatively informal, democratic groups”); Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 488-92
(offering stories of loosely-structured groups but not treating them as aggregates of indi-
vidual clients).
114 See Raymond H. Brescia, Line in the Sand: Progressive Lawyering, “Master Commu-
nities,” and a Battle for Affordable Housing in New York City, 73 ALBANY L. REV 715, 752
(2010) (describing the tension in community lawyering between the needs of the larger
group and the interests of individual members).
115 While several commentators have noted the applicability of Rule 1.13 to community
group representation, none has confronted directly (or sufficiently in depth) the issue of
the status of an informal group. See, e.g., Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem,
supra note 9, at 70 (noting the persistence of the client identity question, but not attempt-
ing to resolve the issue); Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 512 (lamenting the lack of
fit of Rule 1.13 to the fluid community group context); Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1160-61
(applying Rule 1.13 to an informal group without addressing the lawyer’s capacity to estab-
lish the relationship with the apparent entity); Southworth, supra note 1, at 2465 (reporting
empirical research showing that community groups often do not have any “duly authorized
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cludes informal organizations in its definition of entities, and does not
insist that the informal group otherwise have legal standing.116  The
Model Rules agree that Rule 1.13 applies to “unincorporated associa-
tions”;117 and, while the Rules also state that “[a]n organizational cli-
ent is a legal entity,”118 an ABA ethics opinion construes Rule 1.13 as
not requiring the group to possess “a separate jural entity.”119  Hazard
and Hodes’s commentary about the Rules offers an example of an ad
hoc, informal group which qualifies as an entity for purposes of Rule
1.13: seventeen homeowners who choose to hire a single lawyer to
represent them as a group, not as a collection of individuals, with the
homeowners having agreed that the collectivity will be bound by a
decision endorsed by twelve of the seventeen group members.120
While the Hazard & Hodes example appears quite appropriate for the
community group context, the commentators add a dramatic limita-
tion to their understanding of the entity representation conception:
It should be stressed, however, that if the “entity” [i.e., the home-
owners association just described] is not sufficiently formal to have
a real legal existence, such as having a charter and by-laws, then the
representation will be considered to be of a series of individuals
. . . .121
If the Hazard and Hodes commentary is correct,122 then the responsi-
constituents” as Rule 1.13 contemplates).
116 RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 96, Cmt. c (“whether the organization is a formal
legal entity is relevant but not determinative” to the entity conception).  The Restatement
offers as examples of such informal entities “a social club or an informal group that has
established an investment pool.” Id.
117 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13, Cmt. 1.  When this Article addresses an
unincorporated association, it refers to a group which has not formed a formal business
entity in its jurisdiction, as would be the case for many community groups.  In the business
law world, an unincorporated association could include any business entity which is not a
corporation, including any variety of partnership and limited liability companies. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES, GOVERN-
ANCE AND POLICY 53-135 (2009) (addressing “unincorporated business entities” in that
fashion); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010) (describing the
rise of unincorporated associations (for which Ribstein coins the term “uncorporation”)
such as LLCs).
118 Id.  Not every unincorporated association is a recognized legal entity for purposes of
state law. See text accompanying notes 126-28 infra.
119 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 92-365 (1992) (concluding that an
unincorporated trade association may be treated as an entity for purposes of conflicts of
interest).
120 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.4, pp. 17-15. See also Ellmann, supra note
11, at 1116 (discussing the Hazard & Hodes example).
121 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.4, pp. 17-15 – 17-16 (emphasis supplied).
122 William Simon offers some historical support for the Hazard and Hodes assertion.
See Simon, supra note 85, at 113 (“In the past, legal doctrine has tended to draw a sharp
distinction between formally and informally organized associations.  While formally organ-
ized ones were treated as entities, informal organizations were treated as joint individual
representations.”).
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bility of a lawyer working with an ad hoc community group would be
very different from that described by most of the community law-
yering scholarship, which generally assumes a commitment from the
lawyer toward the community group.
It is not apparent that the Hazard and Hodes gloss is a necessary
one.  Contrary to their assertion, it appears to be the case that a law-
yer might establish an attorney-client relationship with an informal
group lacking a charter or formal by-laws.  It is true, as Hazard and
Hodes imply, that an unincorporated association does not have any
distinct legal status in many states.123  Several states have adopted a
version of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act,
which provides otherwise informal associations with rights, duties and
protections.124  In those states, the compliant unincorporated associa-
tions will have recognizable status, and surely a lawyer may represent
such an association as an entity.  Similarly, there is little doubt that
representation of a partnership implicates entity representation obli-
gations,125 and partnerships often emerge as unincorporated associa-
tions.126  For associations lacking such discernable state law
recognition, however, the traditional rule has held that the associa-
tion’s lawyer represents the association’s members, since no “entity”
123 See generally Robert R. Keatinge, The Implications of Fiduciary Relationships in
Representing Limited Liability Companies and Other Unincorporated Associations and
Their Partners or Members, 25 STETSON L. REV. 389, 391 (1995) (some courts do not recog-
nize an association as a legal entity separate from its constituents); United States v. Ameri-
can Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 278 F. Supp. 608, 614 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Schwartz
v. Broadcast Music, 16 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (S.D. N.Y.1954).
124 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, RE-
VISED UNIFORM UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASSOCIATION ACT (2008) [hereinafter
“RUUNAA”].  For examples of state statutes implementing the Model Act or its 1996
predecessor, see Ala. Code §§ 10-3B-1 to 10-3B-18 (Alabama); D.C. Code § 29-971.12
(2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59B-2 (2006) (North Carolina); Art. 1396-70-01 (Texas).  The in-
troductory comments to RUUNAA imply that it offers a codification of some common law
principles and practices, which supports the conclusion that in some states without
RUUNAA or its predecessor unincorporated associations have some legal status. See
RUUNAA, supra, at “Prefatory Note.”
125 For examples of partnerships in which the lawyer was found to represent the entity
and not the partners, see Chaiken v. Lewis, 754 So. 2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Johnson v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 312 (Ct. App. 1995); Morin v. Trupin, 778 F.
Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mursau Corp. v. Fla. Penn Oil & Gas, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 259
(W.D. Pa. 1986). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 91-361
(1991); Keatinge, supra note 123, at 403-04.
126 See, e.g., SCOTT B. EHRLICH & DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, BUSINESS PLANNING 42
(2009) (general partnerships formed merely by associating in business activity, with no
more formal measures needed); 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROM-
BERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP §§ 1.20 – 1.21 (1996) (explaining partnership forma-
tion); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (REVISED) § 202(a) (1997) (“the association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or
not the persons intend to form a partnership,” subject to certain exceptions).
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exists.127  But that traditional understanding is changing.128
The ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, in Formal Opinion 92-365, offered a more nuanced understanding
of the lawyer’s duties to an informal group, although with less analysis
than the issue deserves.  The opinion concluded, without a great deal
of discussion, that a lawyer representing an unincorporated trade as-
sociation could serve as counsel to the organization and not to its
members, even if the organization did not have any independent legal
status.129  Following that ethics opinion, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan in the City of Kalamazoo
v. Michigan Disposal Service Corp. recognized a distinction between
unincorporated associations “whose existence and interests are [so]
intertwined with those of the individual members” as not to be treated
as separate entities, and those with “operations, employees and con-
tinuing existence separate from its members,” which a lawyer may
treat as an entity.130  While the definition offered by the District Court
is close to question-begging,131 it nevertheless grasps a reality of a
group qua group, which captures the essence of much of the commu-
nity lawyering literature.132
127 City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Service Corp., 125 F.Supp 2d 219, 236
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (“Because unincorporated associations had no separate legal existence,
courts regularly held that attorneys for unincorporated associations had a direct attorney-
client relationship with each of the members of the association.”) citing Halverson v. Con-
venient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 930 (7th Cir. 1972); Connelly v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 96 F.R.D. 339, 341 (D. Mass. 1982); Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (“Each individual
member of an unincorporated association is a client of the association’s lawyer.”).
128 City of Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp.2d at 236. See LAWRENCE J. FOX & SUSAN R. MAR-
TYN, THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL FICTIONS FOR CLIENTS 263-
64 (2009) (applying Rule 1.13 to an unincorporated homeowners association).
129 Formal Op. 92-365, supra note 119.  The opinion relies upon Model Rule 1.13’s com-
ment stating that the Rule applies to unincorporated associations, but ignores an accompa-
nying sentence in the same comment which states that an organization is a “legal entity.”
See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13,  Cmt. 1.
130 City of Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 236. See also Franklin v. Callum, 804 A.2d 444
(N.H. 2002); Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. City of Atlantic City, 624 A.2d 102 (N.J.
Super. 1993).
131 The court’s description fosters as many uncertainties as it resolves.  The reference to
“employees” (see City of Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 236) is, seemingly, offered as an
example and not as a condition.  Similarly, the reference to “continuing existence separate
from its members” (id.), when describing an unincorporated association, must be intended
in a metaphorical and not a legal sense, for otherwise no unincorporated association, short
of those covered by partnership law (see notes 125-26 supra) or the Uniform Nonprofit Act
(see RUUNAA, supra note 124), would be covered by the description.
132 A compelling, if perhaps unique, example of an unincorporated association possess-
ing the quality of an entity is that of a labor union.  While now addressed by federal legisla-
tion, historically the status of a labor union as an entity separate from its members was the
subject of much disagreement. See Russell G. Pearce, The Union Lawyer’s Obligations to
Bargaining Unit Members: A Case Study of the Interdependence of Legal Ethics and Sub-
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Given this evolving understanding of the status of unincorporated
associations, we may proceed in our analysis by accepting, at least for
the sake of our ethical deliberation, that a lawyer may have as a client
a group of persons without a formal organization—say, the Hazard
and Hodes homeowners133—whom the lawyer will treat as an entity.
It is, of course, a very good thing that the substantive law evidences an
emerging appreciation for the value of collectivity, given the impor-
tance that groups—including community groups—play in society.134
Before we address how the lawyer’s counseling of such a client
compares to the conventional Binder & Price model (or the variation
we adduced above in the context of well-structured groups), we must
recognize an important predicate, one which helps us address the
counseling questions.  A moment’s reflection demonstrates that, while
it is true that she may lawfully represent a loosely-structured group
such as an unincorporated association, a lawyer may not do so within
the constraints of the law of lawyering unless her client achieves many
of the attributes of a well-structured organization.  That insight seems
indisputable, but it is not necessarily self-evident, nor accepted within
the literature about counseling community groups.135  Before a lawyer
establishes an attorney-client relationship with a group qua group, she
must ensure several things, things which she would know with some
confidence if her client were a formal entity such as an LLC or a cor-
poration.  The first of these is rather obvious:  The lawyer must insure
that the group members recognize themselves as a group.  With a
loosely-structured group this step is essential, but it is presumably
readily accomplished (if perhaps a bit complex in its
implementation136).
stantive Law, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1098-1100 (1996).
133 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17-4; see note 120 supra.
134 See, e.g., AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995) (exploring the
value of collectivity in our society); Lee Anne Fennel, Properties of Concentration, 73 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2006) (exploring “associational” property benefits).
135 See, e.g., Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 510-11 (resisting the application of
formal structures on an organic, fluid group); Diamond, supra note 1, at 70-72 (referring to
well-structured collectivities as “bureaucratic groups,” distinguishing them from “extempo-
raneous groups,” and arguing that community groups fit the latter description much better
than the former); Southworth, supra note 1, at 2465 (noting that community groups often
have no duly authorized constituents). But see Michael J. Fox, Some Rules for Community
Lawyers, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 2 (1980) (suggesting that lawyers for community
groups must find a formal set of structures before they may properly represent the groups).
136 Since this Article addresses a lawyer’s counseling obligations and responsibilities, we
ought to recognize that the lawyer will sometimes need to counsel the group about the
benefits of proceeding as a group rather than as a collection of individuals.  With a loosely-
structured group, that choice is available, unlike with a formal entity such as an LLC, and it
is more available if the population of the loosely-structured group is smaller and more
easily identified.  Of course, in her counseling conversations with the group members, the
lawyer must attend to the status of her relationship with each member during that prelimi-
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Second, the lawyer must identify which individuals are members
of the group.  Occasional stories of progressive lawyers representing
community groups imply a looser identity of the client constituency,137
but traditional understandings of privilege, confidentiality, fiduciary
duty, conflicts of interest and malpractice require that the lawyer un-
derstand with some certainty which persons are her constituents and
which are not.138  A lawyer’s conversation with a constituent of her
entity client will usually be protected by the attorney-client privilege,
while her conversation with a non-constituent (and thus non-client)
will obviously not be privileged.139  A lawyer who assumes incorrectly
that a certain individual is a constituent risks revealing confidences to
a non-client,140 waiving an existing privilege,141 and possibly triggering
nary discussion.  It seems inevitable that, for the preliminary purpose of determining how
the collection of individuals will constitute themselves, the lawyer will owe some duties to
each member individually, which is to say that she will have established a limited attorney-
client relationship with each.  This conclusion arises from the following reasoning:  During
her conversations with the group members about whether to proceed as an entity or as
individuals (either jointly represented by the lawyer or through separate lawyers), the law-
yer is representing somebody.  She is offering legal advice to people who will use it and
rely upon it. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §14 (describing the factors necessary to
establish an attorney-client relationship).  Since the entity theory cannot yet apply to this
interaction (that is the question for the membership to decide), the individual model serves
as the default orientation.  The lawyer may, then, have to engage in the same kind of
conflict of interest warnings that we encountered above in our review of a client’s agree-
ment to joint representation. See text accompanying notes 63-75 supra.
137 Most of the stories emerging from the community lawyering scholarship describe
loosely organized and, as Michael Diamond describes them, “fluid” collectivities.  Dia-
mond, supra note 1, at 72 (“fluid membership” in community groups). See also Bennett,
Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem, supra note 9, at 70 (noting her clinic’s common “in-
quiry not merely into the client’s professed goals but into the client’s very composition”);
Marshall, supra note 1, at 148 (describing an “unattached community advocate,” without
any formal attorney-client relationship); Piomelli, supra note 1, at 457 (describing commu-
nity lawyers “engage[d] with clients and neighborhood residents as partners in a joint ef-
fort”); Seielstad, supra note 5, at 468-69, n.69 (discussing “moving forward without
identifying and officially retaining a cognizable entity or individual as our client”).
One apt example of the tension envisioned here is that of a lawyer’s negotiating a
“community benefits agreement” (CBA) on behalf of a “community” affected by planned
development. See Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: Third-Party Benefi-
ciary Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287,
330-32 (2010) (exploring the enforceability of CBAs); Naved Sheikh, Community Benefits
Agreements: Can Private Contracts Replace Public Responsibility?, 18 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 223, 233-34 (2008) (difficulties with CBAs because of the fluidity of the com-
munities affected).
138 Compare Keatinge, supra note 123, at 413-17 (discussing these issues in the context
of representing unincorporated business associations).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (organizational attorney-client
privilege under federal law); Samaritan Foundation v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993)
(state organizational privilege); RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 73 (offering a very
broad organizational privilege).
140 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.6.
141 A privileged communication may be waived by inadvertent disclosure to a non-party.
\\server05\productn\N\NYC\17-1\NYC112.txt unknown Seq: 40 13-OCT-10 12:44
428 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:389
a conflict of interest.142  The lawyer obviously needs to know to whom
her duties of care lie, and which of the individuals—if any—might
have claims against her for malpractice should the representation go
awry.143
Finally, the lawyer must understand with considerable confidence
the decisionmaking structure of the entity.144  In this way, the notion
of a lawyer representing a loosely-structured group almost approaches
a tautology, because the lawyer cannot accept such a group as a client
unless the group has become, at least in this fashion, well-structured.
The reason for this conclusion should be clear.  In order for the lawyer
to apply the entity theory to her representation, she must accept the
organization, not any of its constituents, as her client.145  The organi-
zation, however, cannot advise the lawyer—and, indeed, the organiza-
tion may not even retain the lawyer146—unless it has an authority-
See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (waiver by
revelation to public relations firm).
142 If the lawyer treats a seeming group member as a client, and offers him some legal
advice about his circumstances, her representation of her entity client might be jeopardized
if that person’s interests conflicted with those of the entity. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (firm disqualified from representing company after hav-
ing offered legal services to a former officer).
143 Some of the community lawyering scholarship envisions a lawyer connected to, and
dedicated to, a diffuse community of affected individuals without explicit attention to the
question of whether any of those persons could treat the community lawyer as his lawyer,
and (should things turn out badly) sue the lawyer or law firm for malpractice. See, e.g.,
Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity, supra note 97, at 832 (describing subgroups within larger
community groups); Diamond, supra note 1, at 127 (describing working with “resident
leadership and its allies” in a community-based housing dispute); Ellmann, supra note 11,
at 1152 (offering to meet with group members individually); Seielstad, supra note 5, at 505
(noting the ethical tensions in group representation but without identifying malpractice
worries); but see Marshall, supra note 1, at 150-51 (addressing the question of client iden-
tity and conflicts of interest in community lawyering practices).  Of course, if the entity
theory applies, as we have assumed it does, none of the constituents of the organization
would have a claim against the lawyer based upon a breach of duty of care theory, except
through the entity’s claims. See, e.g., Palmer v. Fox Software, Inc., 107 F.3d 415 (6th Cir.
1997) (corporate constituent unable to recover against lawyer for malpractice); Waggoner
v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).  That de-
fense available to the lawyer does not, however, minimize her need to understand the
status of the individuals with whom she has contact while she works with a loosely-struc-
tured group client.  “[T]he large volume of case law . . . shows that, whether or not they
ultimately win, lawyers for corporations are frequently sued by constituents who claim an
attorney-client relationship.” Types of Practice: Client Identity, Laws. Man. on Prof. Con-
duct (ABA/BNA) No. 91 at ¶ 10 (2004).  While no such cases have arisen in the context of
community groups, the potential for such claims is plain.
144 See Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 9, at 472-73; Fox, supra note 128,
at 2.
145 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13.
146 This observation is an inevitable one, but its application in practice is subject to some
uncertainty, given the fluidity of group work, especially within low-income communities.
Some writers have assumed a lawyering relationship before the group has a decisionmak-
ing structure in place. See, e.g., Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1146-53 (discussing the lawyer’s
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generating voice emerging from some authority-generating process.
Consider a simplified example.  Imagine the Hazard and Hodes
story noted earlier,147 but with a perhaps more realistic variation of its
facts:  Seventeen homeowners within a subdivision have decided that
they ought to retain a lawyer to prosecute a nuisance action against a
neighboring factory.  At a meeting where twelve of the seventeen
families are represented, the group agrees that three of its members
will contact a lawyer, Kendra Dunlap, to inquire about her represen-
tation of them in this action.148  Kendra agrees to meet in her office
with the three individuals, Maritza, Sharon, and Frank, each a sepa-
rate homeowner from the group.  Her understanding from the prelim-
inary conversations with Maritza, the person setting up the meeting, is
that Kendra will be retained to represent what seems to be an unin-
corporated association.  Kendra intends to accomplish that end in a
way that manifests “best practices,” both with respect to her fiduciary
responsibilities to her soon-to-be group client, and with an eye toward
protecting her from claims of professional malfeasance or breach of
any duty of care.
Let us review Kendra’s role responsibilities as she attempts to de-
velop a relationship with her inchoate entity client:149
(a)  The Initial Meeting:  When Kendra meets with Maritza,
Sharon and Frank, no unincorporated association yet exists.150  If she
role in crafting the decisionmaking schemes with and for the group client).
147 See text accompanying notes 120-123 supra; HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at
§17.4.
148 In the Hazard and Hodes story, the seventeen homeowners have already decided
when they retain the lawyer that they will be bound by the votes of any twelve of the
collectivity. See id.  That factor permits Hazard and Hodes to make the points they need
to make, but it seems quite serendipitous.  More likely, one assumes, would be the varia-
tion in the text—the homeowners have a shared mission and approach the lawyer without
having worked through the logistics of accomplishing their shared mission.  The stories
from the “community lawyering” literature tend to acknowledge that client groups (which,
by the way, tend to be less powerful and less sophisticated than suburban homeowners)
come to the lawyers with more diffuse instructions and organization.
149 To reaffirm the obvious, if the homeowners were an established state corporation
and chose to retain a lawyer, none of the forthcoming strategic issues would concern Ken-
dra, because the authority schemes and the status of the members of the organization
would be clear from the corporation’s organizing documents and the entity’s organiza-
tional “framework of dealing.” See Simon, supra note 85, at 86-96 (recommending that
lawyers rely less on formal concepts and more on an organization’s framework of dealing
to determine how to respond to internal dissonance).
150 This discussion assumes that, for purposes of Rule 1.13 and its representational du-
ties, no “entity” arises until the organization itself achieves some form of identifiable core.
The 17 homeowners who have agreed to their collective mission of ridding their neighbor-
hood of the nuisance do not qualify yet as an entity merely by virtue of that collective
mission.  Put another way, the default orientation under the law of lawyering is an individ-
ual representation model.  Put yet another way still, a lawyer takes great risks if she as-
sumes that her fiduciary duties run to an emerging and inchoate entity and not to its
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is meeting with the three homeowners in her capacity as a lawyer (a
given here), Kendra must consider the three persons as her individual
clients for the present purposes.  She would not yet have any direct
relationship with the other fourteen homeowners, except in this way:
Kendra could offer to the three persons her advice about their fiduci-
ary responsibilities toward the remaining group members, at least for
the limited time before the group emerges as an entity, as an unincor-
porated association.  For this limited purpose, then, we might under-
stand Kendra to represent the three persons in their role as
fiduciaries, as guardians, of the interests of their compatriots.151  Ken-
dra will of course make the two following elements of that role quite
clear to Maritza, Sharon and Frank: its temporal limitation (assuming
that soon enough Kendra will represent only the entity and not these
constituents), and the gloss on the relationship triggered by her under-
standing that Maritza, Sharon and Frank are present as agents and
fiduciaries, and not simply in their individual capacities pursuing their
individual interests.  Kendra ought to obtain informed consent from
each individual to the limitations of this representation.152
(b)  Choosing to Proceed as an Entity:  In some metaphysical way,
the “entity” of this homeowners association might be said to exist
once the seventeen members agree to their shared mission, but from
Kendra’s perspective she does not yet recognize an entity which may
be her client.  It is fair to say that, given what we see Kendra having
learned so far from the three client/fiduciaries, she could not establish
an attorney-client relationship with the homeowners association.
Kendra, of course, may assist her three agent/clients to establish the
organization, just as lawyers represent promoters to form an entity all
the time.153  But first, she would have the responsibility to counsel the
membership in the absence of great clarity to the contrary.
151 Understanding her role here as a lawyer for a fiduciary (at least provisionally), Ken-
dra has some guidance about how she ought to treat the persons who are nominally her
clients.  Some courts hold that an attorney retained by a guardian owes a duty to the ward
as well. See, e.g., Fickett v. Superior Court of Pima County, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. App.
1976).  The threshold inquiry is whether the non-client plaintiff was the intended benefici-
ary of the attorney-guardian relationship. See Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1084-85
(Wash. 1994).  For a discussion of these issues, see Charles M. Bennett, Frontiers in Ethics:
The Estate Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty and Confidentiality to the Fiduciary Client: Examining
the Past to Make Wise Choices Now and in the Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 807 (2007).
152 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.2(c) (limitation of representation permissi-
ble if not unreasonable and the client provides informed consent).  If she understands that
the limitations engendered by her working with the three persons as fiduciaries rather than
as self-interested actors as a form of conflict of interest (that is, Kendra’s dedication to the
fiduciary goals conflicts with her duty otherwise to the individuals), she must obtain any
informed consent in writing. Id, at R. 1.7(c).
153 See, e.g., EHRLICH & MICHAEL, supra note 126, at 10-11 (describing the lawyer’s
relationship with promoters, those who work with counsel to create an organization);
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three persons—along with any others within the group who choose to
attend a meeting with her154—about the wisdom of proceeding as an
unincorporated association versus proceeding in some other way.155
If she sees the role of her three clients as fiduciaries, Kendra may
properly work directly with them to assist them to work with the re-
maining fourteen homeowners to decide whether to form an associa-
tion.  Nothing requires her to have any other contact with the
remaining homeowners for this undertaking.  Kendra may employ the
conventional Binder & Price counseling model in this task,156 outlin-
ing the discrete alternatives, describing their components, and eliciting
the advantages and disadvantages of each in turn.  Nothing, thus far,
suggests that Kendra would proceed in anything but a neutral fashion
with these individual clients choosing among those alternative
avenues.157
SCOTT THOMAS FITZGIBBON, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ORGANIZING CORPORATIONS, AND
THE IDEOLOGY OF CORPORATE ARTICLES AND BY-LAWS 12-13 (1982) (reviewing the ethi-
cal considerations inherent in representing promoters).
154 A practical understanding of this story suggests that, if Kendra were to meet with her
clients on several occasions before the emergence of a recognized entity client, some other
members of the original 17 homeowners might attend a later meeting with Kendra.  If
Kendra has established a limited and special purpose attorney-client relationship with Ma-
ritza, Sharon and Frank as described above, she must be attentive to the role played by a
new homeowner who attends a later meeting.  It appears that Kendra has a choice to add
that homeowner as another fiduciary/client like the first three, or to treat that newcomer as
a non-client attending a meeting with her clients.  Under the latter scenario, Kendra risks
waiving the attorney-client privilege for her conversations during the meeting, unless the
newcomer is seen as the “ward” of the three named clients. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of
North America v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 880, 886 (App. 1980) (the presence of a
ward at a consultation between his guardian and the guardian’s counsel would not result in
waiver of the attorney-client privilege).
155 Stephen Ellmann concludes that the homeowners would have four options for pro-
ceeding—as individual, separate clients with a single lawyer (joint representation as we
identified above); as clients choosing a lawyer as an “intermediary,” using the now-dis-
carded Model Rule 2.2; as an entity; and as a class action. See Ellmann, supra note 11, at
1113-19.  For our purposes, we might amend Ellmann’s list slightly.  Kendra’s clients could
proceed as seventeen jointly represented clients; or Kendra could represent one of them to
pursue injunctive relief from which the collectivity would benefit as well (if the facts per-
mitted this remedy, of course); as an entity, formal or unincorporated; and as a class.  It is
not clear (and not relevant for our purposes) if seventeen members qualify as sufficiently
numerous for class certification.  Courts will presume numerosity when a class consists of
forty or more people, but focus on impracticability rather than sheer numbers. See Cortigi-
ano v. Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, 227 F.R.D. 194, 204 (E.D. N.Y. 2005); Sanft v.
Winnebago Industries, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 514, 520-21 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (“In dealing with the
issue of numerosity, we deal with it not in absolute numbers, but in the relationship of the
numbers of the putative class members involved to their economic interests and all of the
other circumstances peculiar to [each] case.” (quoting Elliott Assoc. v. J. Henry Schroder
Bank & Trust, 655 F. Supp. 1281, 1285 (S.D.N.Y.1987))).
156 See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra (describing the prevailing model and struc-
ture of a choice-based counseling session).
157 It is likely true that, along the continuum of deference to intervention within a coun-
seling stance, counseling a fiduciary invites somewhat less deference from the lawyer than
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(c)  Constructing the Unincorporated Association:  Imagine this,
then:  After Kendra has carefully advised Maritza, Sharon and Frank
about the prospect of proceeding as an association, including the im-
plications of entity representation versus individual representation,158
the three report back to her that the seventeen homeowners wish to
proceed as an entity.  There is no reason, they have concluded, that
the seventeen people ought to go to the expense and administrative
burdens of forming a formal corporation, so they opt for an unincor-
porated association.159  For convenience, assume they give the associa-
tion a name—the Concerned Homeowners Improvement Association
(CHIA).
Kendra cannot yet accept CHIA as her client—or, more accu-
rately, she could not do anything as its lawyer even if she concluded
that she has authority to be retained by the entity.  The missing ele-
ment is a scheme for CHIA’s decisionmaking, the absence of which
handcuffs any lawyer’s work.  While Kendra might conclude that she
has sufficient authority to treat CHIA as her client given the report
back from Maritza, Sharon and Frank, a conclusion which itself would
counseling an individual about his own personal legal matters, using the evaluative tools
we explored above. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.  What we referred to above
as the “idiosyncrasy” factor has less weight when the client serves in a fiduciary role—
indeed, the fiduciary’s personal predilections should play no role at all in the substituted
judgment process, which is the usual moral commitment of a guardian or trustee. See
Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1267-68 (Mass. 1992) (discussing the use and ex-
pansion of the substituted judgment doctrine in the context of medical treatment); Peter
Skinner, Note, Tipping the Scales: How Guardianship of Brandon Has Upset Massachusetts’
Balanced Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 40 B.C. L. REV. 969 (1999).  In the context de-
scribed in the text, however, Kendra has little reason to assume anything but a fully defer-
ential role, since she is, essentially, counseling her clients about how to counsel their
compatriots.  Indeed, since she is not asking Maritza, Sharon and Frank to make a decision,
the idea of persuasion or intervention seems inapposite.
158 The most important of which would be the fact that, under entity representation,
Kendra would not be the lawyer for any of the individual homeowners. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13(f).  This conclusion applies to an unincorporated associa-
tion just as it would to a corporation, at least in some settings, and we have assumed for
present purposes that this setting fits that description. See discussion accompanying notes
123-34 supra.
159 If they intend to file a state court lawsuit to abate the nuisance, in most jurisdictions
the collectivity cannot remain an unincorporated association, as unincorporated associa-
tions typically may not be party plaintiffs. See, e.g., Diluzio v. United Elec., Radio and
Mach. Workers of America, Local 274, 435 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Mass. 1982) (common law
rule that “[t]here is no such entity known to the law as an unincorporated association, and
consequently [an unincorporated labor union] cannot be made a party defendant,” quoting
Pickett v. Walsh, 78 N.E. 753 (Mass. 1906)).  Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that unincorporated associations may sue or be sued as distinct entities
in the district court where the claims at hand arise under federal law. FED. R. CIV. P.
17(b).  As to all other claims, however, the capacity of an unincorporated association to sue
or be sued as a distinct entity is determined “by the law of the state where the court is
located.” Id.
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be questionable,160 she plainly does not have a confident means to
ensure that she has the necessary authority to take any lawyering ac-
tions on the client’s behalf.
Just as she worked with Maritza, Sharon and Frank to prepare
them to counsel the remaining fourteen homeowners about whether
or not to proceed as an entity,161 Kendra may now work with the three
client/fiduciaries, or perhaps with the entire group of seventeen or
some other subset of CHIA, to craft some authority scheme by which
CHIA will make binding decisions upon which its lawyer will rely.
Stephen Ellmann, in his thoughtful assessment of public interest law-
yers’ responsibilities with community groups, argues that at this stage
a lawyer such as Kendra has a responsibility “for assuring a baseline
of democratic and participative process within the group . . . .”162  For
Ellmann, that responsibility requires the lawyer to attend the meeting
of the group, and to intervene sufficiently to ensure full participation
by its members, and “to encourage silent members, during the meet-
ing, to speak their minds.”163  Whether Ellmann’s proposition has
some greater force in the context of community groups is a question
we shall examine in a later part of this Article,164 but for our present
purposes, where we seek to understand and articulate the best prac-
tices of a lawyer representing any unincorporated association, commu-
nity-based or otherwise, his suggestions are unpersuasive, both in
160 Because unincorporated associations are, well, unincorporated, the question of
whether one exists or not is just a little bit ambiguous.  When Maritza, Sharon and Frank
report to Kendra that the homeowners have agreed to work together as a group (and
assuming that the three have accurately communicated Kendra’s warnings about the ab-
sence of any individual attorney-client relationships as a result of that choice), one might
conclude (a) that an unincorporated association now exists and, perhaps more boldly, (b)
that Maritza, Sharon and Frank have the authority from the association to retain Kendra as
its lawyer.  Given the usual operation of the doctrine of implied authority, Kendra takes
little risk by accepting that the three client/fiduciaries are agents of the new association.
See, e.g., BRANSON ET AL., supra note 117, at 9-16 (discussing the role of agency principles
in organizational practice); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note 89, at 3.03;
RUUNAA, supra note 124, at §15, Comment (a member of an unincorporated association
is not an agent by virtue of membership, but may establish apparent agency by an estab-
lished course of dealing).
161 See text accompanying notes 151-56 supra.  Of course, Kendra herself could counsel
the group of 17, but the discussion assumes a setting where the lawyer works with leaders
who work with the group.
162 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1145.
163 Id.  Interestingly, Ellmann does not assert expressly that a lawyer such as Kendra
must attend the community group meeting; his discussion assumes that “counseling com-
munity groups” means that the lawyer counsels the group, rather than its agents.  His dis-
cussion consistently envisions the lawyer at the meeting, and he puzzles through with
wonderful sensitivity the complicated relationship between the lawyer and the individual
group members. See id., at 1135-70.  As I develop in the text, that assumption does not
seem a justifiable one, and is likely not a practical or realistic one in many contexts.
164 See text accompanying notes 211-15 infra.
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theory and in practice.
Consider Ellmann’s arguments from the perspective of legal (and
moral) theory.  It is hard to disagree with the proposition that a demo-
cratically-run and fully participatory group is, by and large, more
likely to be a successful group and more likely to satisfy the needs of
its membership.165  One could argue that it would be a good thing, all
things considered and with a humble understanding of what we mean
by “good,”166 if CHIA were operated in that fashion.  But for Ken-
dra’s purposes, she needs to know how to read her group’s intentions,
in a faithful and reliable way, and however those intentions were de-
rived.  If, for whatever reasons, the CHIA membership opted to pro-
ceed in an autocratic and non-participatory way and articulated that
choice in some reliable fashion to Kendra, nothing in the law of law-
yering, or in accepted applied ethics discourse,167 would suggest that
Kendra ought to resist accepting that delegation.  CHIA possesses its
own autonomy rights to choose its own decisionmaking matrices.168
Consider also Ellmann’s critique from the perspective of Ken-
dra’s practice as a lawyer working with CHIA, a voluntary association
of otherwise-busy homeowners.  Ellmann’s examples assume group
meetings with full attendance by group members, and the lawyer’s
presence as well.  While in her work with CHIA Kendra might attend
a meeting with such qualities, it is far more likely, simply as a matter
of workaday practicality, that the group meetings will have imperfect
attendance, and that Kendra will meet more often than not with cer-
tain designated leaders or constituents than with a full group.169  Cor-
165 See RUPERT BROWN, GROUP PROCESSES: DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN
GROUPS 218-19 (2000).  Brown, in discussing “devices and procedures that maximize the
effective participation of all group members,” reports on research showing that, generally,
group decisions arriving from broad participation tend to be better than those not so gen-
erated. Id.
166 See Simon, Mrs. Jones’s Case, supra note 103, at 224 (noting the absence of a “thick
theory of the good” outside of theological arenas, and instead understanding good by ref-
erence to some notions of autonomous choice).
167 See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 519 (noting that there may be reasons to
respect undemocratic processes, even with disadvantaged community groups).  In her ex-
amination of the autonomy commitment toward individual clients (and not addressing
groups), Katherine Kruse recognizes the value of “positive liberty” as a contributor to
effective autonomous progress. See Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 413.  Her
reasoning supports some nudging by lawyers toward increased opportunity for their clients
to exercise autonomy, but even her arguments do not suggest that a group may not choose
to defer to leadership as an effective organizational device. Id. at 423-24 (supporting the
concept of client empowerment).  For further consideration of this point, see BROWN,
supra note 165, at 218-19.
168 Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 524-25.  Ellmann recognizes the group’s rights
in his article, but he understandably worries more about the autonomy rights of the mem-
bers of the group. See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1152.
169 While this topic has not been addressed in the community lawyering literature, it is
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porate lawyers seldom meet with the employees, shareholders, or
other constituents of the entity, and those lawyers are in fact limited in
the direction they may take from constituents outside of the officers,
directors or general counsel.170  While it may be more likely for a law-
yer working with an unincorporated association than a corporation’s
lawyer to be able to meet with the entity membership, the fact re-
mains that Kendra needs a best practices guide that anticipates most
of her meetings through some constituents.171  Arranging (or at least
discerning) a set of protocols about how she works with the unincor-
porated association’s constituents is the essential task that Kendra
must accomplish.
Therefore, Kendra may and likely will work with some associa-
tion members to identify a protocol for making organizational deci-
sions.  Until she understands that protocol, Kendra may not take any
legal action on behalf of her entity client.172  But that conclusion
sensible to conclude that a lawyer for a community group will, as a practical matter in her
work life, take direction from the group leaders, with membership meetings a rarer event.
170 See, e.g., FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 58-59 (noting the importance of clarify-
ing the internal organizational hierarchy).  Corporate lawyers do not take direction from
shareholders, even though the latter “own” the business. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Solving
the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 181, 207 (2004) (“the lawyer takes her direction from the entity’s duly authorized
constituents”); Simon, Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, supra note 85, at 82 (criticizing the
Model Rules’ limitation on lawyers’ communication with shareholders about wrongdoing).
Ordinarily, employees who are not officers do not direct a company lawyer, although the
context may create such authority. See Charles Silver, The Legal Establishment Meets the
Republican Revolution, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1250 (1996) (“[W]hen a constituent has
apparent authority to retain an attorney on particular terms, the fact that the constituent
lacks actual authority, by virtue of a contrary company rule, has no impact on the lawyer’s
obligations so long as the attorney reasonably believed that the constituent was authorized
to enter into the retainer agreement.”).
171 One possibly critical by-product of the stance adopted here, compared to that pro-
posed by Ellmann, is that the best practices being developed in this Article do not assume
that the lawyer is an active member of the group process.  Much of the community law-
yering scholarship grapples with that role question, and we revisit it below in our consider-
ation of the community group setting. See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1166; Diamond &
O’Toole, supra note 2, at 541-42 (implying group membership by the lawyer); Scott L.
Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L.
REV. 443, 502-10 (2001); Bennett, Creating a Client Consortium, supra note 9.  For pur-
poses of articulating best practices for lawyers working with unincorporated associations
generally, and not necessarily within disadvantaged communities or with community
groups, this part of the Article need not envision the lawyer to be herself an insider viewed
by the other constituents as part of the group process.  While nothing within the law of
lawyering prohibits Kendra from playing that role, doing so does create delicate issues for
the lawyer.  We encounter those issues in our later discussion. See text accompanying
notes 187-93 infra.
172 Without that established protocol, Kendra risks acting without entity authorization,
which invites both agency problems and malpractice exposure. See, e.g., Shimko v.
Guenther, 505 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2007) (attorney should have known that limited part-
ner was not general partner; claim for apparent authority denied); Zeiger v. Wilf, 775 A.2d
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masks one additional consideration we must assess before moving on,
and that consideration does tie into Ellmann’s concern for par-
ticipatory functioning within the group process.  The question is this:
How much need Kendra affirm with the group membership the proto-
cols reported back to her by the leadership?  In a formal corporate
setting, this question simply does not arise, because the organizational
documents provide a most reliable protocol for the lawyer.173  In
Ellmann’s conception of the lawyer’s role, this question does not arise
either, because in his vision the group meets as a whole and the lawyer
is present with the group.174  But given the direction the preceding
discussion has taken, this question is an important one for a lawyer
such as Kendra.
Imagine, then, this scenario.  After Kendra has counseled Ma-
ritza, Sharon and Frank about the need for CHIA to identify some
scheme by which the entity may be bound and through which it may
give its lawyer direction and authority, the three constituents depart to
meet with the remaining fourteen members.  When they return, Ma-
ritza, Sharon and Frank report to Kendra that the group has delegated
full decisionmaking authority to the three leaders, whose majority
vote will prevail on all matters.  In other words, any two of the three
leaders may bind the association.  Like with the Hazard & Hodes ex-
ample,175 it appears that Kendra now has the protocol she needs to
begin her lawyering work.  May she rely on this report from Maritza,
Sharon and Frank?
No best practices guide can answer that question with any cer-
tainty, because its response depends too much upon the context of the
group interaction.  In the absence of a formal written agreement, Ken-
dra relies upon the three leaders, Maritza, Sharon and Frank, to serve
as the source of Kendra’s agency authority.176  If we understand the
608, 616-19 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2000) (“safe harbor” provisions protect limited partner from
liability as a general partner); See also 19 ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE
§ 14.6 (2d ed.) (speculating that “limited partner who tattoos ‘I am a limited partner’ on his
forehead, or wears such a T-shirt, may participate in the control of the business without
fear of being held liable as a general partner”).
173 See FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 57-59.
174 See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1136-37.
175 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.4, Illus. 17-2 (the group decided that a
vote of twelve of the seventeen members would bind the group as a whole).
176 Whether the association’s leaders are agents of the collectivity is an elusive consider-
ation.  If the leaders were board members of a formal entity, their status would be akin to,
but probably not, that of agent for the entity. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s
Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; Unanswered Questions 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1171
(2003) (describing the “agency theory” of director status, which Heminway views as “both
legally questionable and appealing”).  Officers of a corporation more easily fit within the
understanding of agents, because they answer to their “principal,” the board. See id. at
1173-74.
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lawyer as herself an agent relying upon the authority of another
agent,177 then we can assess her responsibilities under general agency
law.  That authority would hold that if the delegation of authority to
her is reasonable under the circumstances, Kendra may proceed.178
When it is reasonable under the circumstances is entirely dependent
upon the circumstances.  If the goal of the representation is for abate-
ment of the nuisance or for some kind of similar injunctive relief, Ken-
dra’s authority may be more readily accepted.  If, by contract, CHIA’s
goal is to collect damages to be divided up among its membership,
Kendra’s responsibility for confirming the decisionmaking scheme
seems to be greater.179
Regardless of the context, nothing prohibits Kendra from com-
municating directly with each member of CHIA, by separate letters
for example, to confirm her understanding of the decisionmaking pro-
tocol agreed to by the membership.  Doing so seems a prudent action
on her part notwithstanding the level of her comfort with the reported
membership agreement.180  This step also helps to accomplish a fur-
177 Whether a lawyer is considered an agent of her client is once again a question with-
out a clear answer. See James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characteriza-
tion “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFFALO L. REV. 349, 349-50 (2000); Deborah A. DeMott,
The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301 (1998); Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsi-
bility for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship, 86 NEB. L. REV. 346, 350-51 (2007).  Because lawyers have more discretion and
autonomy than agents traditionally have, some argue that lawyers are better understood as
independent contractors. See DeMott, supra, at 305-06.
178 See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, supra note 89, at §§ 2.03, 3.03; see also American
Prairie Const. Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2009) (third-party must prove he acted
in a reasonably diligent and prudent fashion to ascertain the fact of the agency and the
nature and extent of the agent’s authority); Udall v. T.D. Escrow Services, Inc., 154 P.3d
882 (Wash. 2007) (despite lack of actual authority, plaintiff could reasonably believe that
principal or its agent would conduct the transaction in question based on principal’s
representations).
179 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.8(g) (discussing aggregate settlements);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 128, Cmt. d(i) (noting the importance of the lawyer’s
ascertaining the agreement of joint clients to the terms of an aggregate settlement).  While
both Rule 1.8(g) and the Restatement address joint representation, and not entity repre-
sentation, the prospect that the members will divide up a collective judgment or settlement
suggests greater risk on Kendra’s part to insure the buy-in from the membership.
180 Note that Kendra presumably has permission under Rule 1.6 to communicate about
the subject matter of the representation with the constituents of CHIA. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.6(a) (information related to the representation may not be
disclosed without client consent or unless some exception applies).  An organizational law-
yer does not possess automatic permission to reveal protected information to every constit-
uent of the organization merely because the constituents are part of the client organization.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 96 cmt. e (“disclosure within the organization is
subject to the direction of a constituent who is authorized to act for the organization”).  In
our example, Kendra has at least implied authorization to communicate directly with the
CHIA membership. See Rule 1.6(a) (disclosure permitted when “impliedly authorized to
carry out the representation”).
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ther necessary element of Kendra’s representation of CHIA—ascer-
taining its defined membership, as discussed above.181
2. Counseling a Loosely-Structured Group
The exploration thus far has concluded that a lawyer might in-
deed represent a loosely-defined group as an entity, subject to the gui-
dance of Rule 1.13 and its accompanying substantive law.  But,
precisely because the group is ill-defined and possibly ambiguous in its
membership and in its organizational decisionmaking schemes, the
lawyer may not accept the group as a client until she is certain (a) that
the group has agreed to proceed as an entity; (b) that the group has a
defined an identifiable membership who serve as the constituents of
the entity; and (c) that the group has adopted and agreed to a scheme
by which to take actions and make binding decisions, including the act
of giving authority to its lawyer to proceed with legal work.  While
stories appear within the public interest literature of lawyers working
with collectivities of persons with common shared missions but with
fuzzy membership identities and ambiguous leadership arrange-
ments,182 and while undoubtedly lawyers work with such nebulous
groups regularly, the conclusion here is that the laws of agency, pro-
fessional responsibility and legal malpractice suggest some risks in
such a practice.183  Only by transforming the loosely-defined group
into a better-defined group may a lawyer proceed to represent its
membership using entity representation principles.
Assume that Kendra and CHIA have met the requirements just
described, and that Kendra has in place a retainer agreement signed
by her and by Maritza, Sharon and Frank on behalf of CHIA.  The
question now is the one originally conceived for this part of the Arti-
cle:  Do Kendra’s counseling responsibilities change at all, when com-
pared to her work with an individual client matter or from her work
with a formal corporation or LLC, when her client is an ill-defined
group?
We quickly realize that the question as just articulated must be
refined.  There is no doubt that Kendra’s responsibilities when coun-
181 See text accompanying notes 160-163 supra.
182 See notes 135 and 137 supra (providing examples from the community lawyering
scholarship).
183 From my conversations with colleagues who work directly with community groups, I
understand that fluid groups are inevitable, and that lawyers’ work with those groups is
equally inevitable.  Furthermore, the lawyers’ work supporting grass-roots, organic organi-
zation is very important, and will continue even if the groups cannot achieve the kind of
formality, structure or bureaucracy that the substantive law of lawyering might seem to
require.  While the analysis here demonstrates the risks of that kind of practice, the lawyers
committed to that kind of practice may conclude that those risks—which some may per-
ceive as more conceptual than practical—are worth taking.
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seling CHIA are different from her responsibilities with an individual
client (like our comparison divorce client184) at least as much as they
would differ when she works with a well-defined group client.  Since
we concluded above that a lawyer working for a formal corporation
should (or at least may) interact differently with a constituent client
compared to an individual client,185 it is easy to discern here that, at
minimum, the same reasoning would apply to a lawyer working with a
constituent of an unincorporated association or similar nebulous
group client.  The more interesting question is whether the lack of a
formal corporate-type structure changes the lawyer’s role further, or
whether we have already addressed this topic when we addressed the
setting of the well-structured group.  Put another way, our question as
refined is this:  Are the counseling protocols the same for well-defined
and ill-defined group clients, or is there some difference caused by the
fuzzier group structures in the latter case?
The fuzzier group structure does seem to create further differ-
ences for the lawyer in comparison to her work with a formal corpo-
rate structure.  Those differences may be separated into two sorts,
depending on whether the lawyer works through a constituent of the
entity, or works with the unincorporated association membership as a
whole.  Let us review each of those areas in order.
Counseling a Loosely-Defined Entity Constituent:  The discussion
thus far has assumed that the lawyer will work with the unincorpo-
rated association through some constituent or constituents.  Recall
that this assumption departed from some of the writing about public
interest lawyers working with community groups,186 but it seems a
reasonable (if assuredly not exclusive) assumption.  When Kendra
meets with Maritza, Sharon and Frank to counsel them about an im-
portant upcoming decision which the client CHIA must make, her re-
sponsibilities with them will mirror those discerned in the example of
corporate constituent counseling, using the Dan and MCDC example
above.187  In the same way that we concluded that Dan has less of a
moral or prudential obligation to honor the idiosyncrasies of the con-
stituent with whom he happened to be meeting (when compared to a
lawyer with an individual client), Kendra need not treat Maritza,
Sharon and Frank as entitled to the same deference either.  But the
difference is greater in a loosely-structured group using constituents,
for readily apparent reasons.  The absence of a formal, articulated and
184 See text accompanying note 103-08 supra.
185 See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
186 See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1135-70; Diamond, supra note 1, at 119-20; Seielstad,
supra note 5, at 466-67. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
187 See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
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binding authority structure within CHIA requires Kendra to bear a
greater responsibility to get things right.  While from the perspective
of the law of lawyering Kendra may rely fully on the risk assessments
and preferences of the appointed188 leaders of CHIA without a con-
cern about having breached her duties of care,189 as a matter of her
ethical commitment to be the best counselor for her entity client, Ken-
dra may do more than that.  Context matters a lot, again, but the in-
herent ambiguity of the leadership appointment of Maritza, Sharon
and Frank permits Kendra to intervene with them even to a greater
extent than she would if they were, say, managers of an LLC or of-
ficers of a corporation.
Consider a very brief and “thin” story to make this point clearer.
Imagine that, as CHIA’s lawyer, Kendra has been negotiating with the
nuisance-creating actor about a possible resolution of the dispute.
The negotiations have been productive, but reach a complicated stick-
ing point.  The nuisance-creating actor has made it clear that if CHIA
went to the press or otherwise publicly disclosed the parties’ dispute,
the proposed deal would be off.190  Kendra counsels Maritza, Sharon
and Frank about their discrete alternatives—go to the press and (pos-
sibly191) endanger a seemingly advantageous settlement, or not go to
the press and continue the negotiations.  If her CHIA constituents or-
der Kendra to go to the press, and if she has some reason to doubt
whether that high-risk (albeit entirely lawful and permissible) tactic
reflects the considered wisdom of the seventeen members of CHIA,
Kendra may, and perhaps must as a matter of her moral obligation to
the unincorporated association, resist the constituents in ways which
she would seldom do with an individual client and would do less vigor-
ously with a corporate constituent.
This more “activist” role for the lawyer representing a loosely-
structured group stems from a number of considerations.  The inher-
ent doubts about the representativeness of the leadership in the
188 We assume here that Maritza, Sharon and Frank have been approved by the CHIA
membership to speak for it, or at least that Kendra has a good faith basis to believe that.
189 See Silver, supra note 170, at 1250.
190 For a real, and recent, example of this kind of negotiation, see, e.g., Glenwood Farms
Inc. v. Ivey, 335 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Me. 2004) and Ehrlich v. Stern, 908 N.E.2d 797 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2009) (internal disputes by plaintiffs’ counsel, including Jan Schlichtmann, in Po-
land Springs class action proceedings, in which disclosures to the press may have led to a
failure of negotiations).
191 The threat by the nuisance-creating actor might be a bluff, of course. See ROGER
FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 132 (2d ed. 1991); Albert Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46
HARV. BUS. REV. 143 (1968) (defending the use of deception and bluffing in the business
world); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1285 (1996) (“[s]uccessful bargaining
often requires bluffing”).
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loosely-structured group suggest a greater responsibility on Kendra’s
part as the entity’s lawyer.192  The nature of unincorporated associa-
tions themselves, and the relationship of a lawyer to such a group, also
increases the lawyer’s vigilance.  It is not unfair to assume that
loosely-structured groups tend to be newer and deserve enhanced fi-
duciary attention from their lawyers.  In some respects, the role for
the lawyer here resembles that of a lawyer for a class in a class action
proceeding.  While the considerable substantive and procedural pro-
tections governing class actions provide significantly better guidance
to plaintiff class lawyers than to the unincorporated association law-
yers discussed here,193 the role of a lawyer for a class pre-filing is
closer to the present context.194  In that setting as well in the conven-
tional post-filing context, a lawyer representing a plaintiff class has
explicit responsibilities to the unnamed class members, and may resist
the suggestions of a named plaintiff whose choices are not deemed to
be in the best interests of the collectivity.195
Especially when the loosely-structured group is large enough to
192 The analysis in the text rests on a premise which may be questionable.  It presumes
that in formal groups the lawyer may respect the quality of the leadership in some reasona-
bly reliable way, given the leaders’ formal delegation of authority.  In practice, of course,
organizational leaders’ fidelity to organizational goals is intrinsically subject to question.
See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. REV.
797 (2001).
193 See Nancy J. Moore, Who Should Regulate Class Action Lawyers?, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1477 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
194 A lawyer who represents a purported class before a lawsuit is filed owes a duty to the
class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2)(A), 2003 Advis. Comm. Notes (“Settlement may be
discussed before certification . . . .  Whether or not formally designated interim counsel, an
attorney who acts on behalf of a class before certification must act in the best interests of
the class as a whole.  For example, an attorney who negotiates a pre-certification settle-
ment must seek a settlement that is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class.”); MAN-
UAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §21.12 at 337 & n. 753 (4th ed. 2007) (“Rule 23 and the
case law make clear that, even before certification or a formal attorney-client relationship,
an attorney acting on behalf of a putative class must act in the best interest of the class as a
whole.”); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 38.4, at 38-7 (lawyers for the proposed
class owes class members “duties of loyalty and care”); Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,
1144 (2d Cir. 1985) (duty triggered because counsel, by “asserting a representative role,”
“voluntarily accepted a fiduciary obligation towards the members of the putative class”);
In re M&F Worldwide Corp. Shareholders Litig., 799 A.2d 1164, 1174 n.34 (Del. Ch. Ct.
2002) (“[I]t is well established that by asserting a representative role on behalf of a pro-
posed class, representative plaintiffs and their counsel voluntarily accept a fiduciary obliga-
tion towards members of the putative class.”).
195 See In re M & F Worldwide Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 799 A.2d 1164, 1175
(2002) (“Counsel in class action . . . owed a duty to act in good faith on behalf of all
interested beneficiaries of the representative action, and not simply at the direction of the
named plaintiffs.”).
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make counseling the entire group impractical (likely a common phe-
nomenon in neighborhood-based community group representation),
the lawyer working with the group’s leadership shares the responsibili-
ties of a class lawyer to ensure that the leaders’ views are consonant
with the aims and goals of the larger group.196  The lawyer’s “activ-
ism” with the leadership will depend also on how well the lawyer her-
self understands the group’s aims and goals.
If the unincorporated association membership is reasonably man-
ageable in size, the lawyer might suggest to the constituents/leaders
that she wishes to speak with the entire membership before taking a
high risk step such as the one imagined in the CHIA story above.  One
can easily imagine an unincorporated association in which, while the
choice of spokespersons is clear enough for the lawyer to proceed with
adequate authority, the quality of the delegation to that leadership is
sufficiently uncertain that the lawyer would have the right—and per-
haps the obligation—to reach out to the larger membership for confir-
mation of the leaders’ chosen path.  CHIA fits the first of these
qualifications, as its seventeen members constitute a plausibly man-
ageable group.  Imagine that Kendra concludes in good faith that
CHIA meets the second qualification as well, at least with respect to a
high risk tactic such as going public over the objections of the group’s
adversary.  That assumption permits us to address the role of a lawyer
counseling a loosely-structured group through the membership as a
whole.197
Counseling a Loosely-Defined Entity Through Its Membership:
Stephen Ellmann has examined the dynamics of a lawyer counseling a
196 Michael Diamond and Aaron O’Toole make this point. See Diamond & O’Toole,
supra note 2, at 512-15.
197 At the risk of developing too many permutations of the questions we are trying to
understand here, I should note that we might further subdivide the contexts of a lawyer
working with a loosely-structured group’s full membership.  The distinction I have in mind
would be between such groups which have appointed and delegated authority to identified
leaders (such as CHIA), and those loosely-structured groups which have opted to proceed
without any formal leadership, but instead to proceed as a “committee of the whole.”
Does a lawyer meeting with the full group have differing responsibilities depending on
whether the group has appointed a leader or leaders?  The answer to that question seems
to be no, based upon an application of conventional agency law.  The membership in this
puzzle represents the principal; the appointed leaders represent direct agents of the princi-
pal, authorized to speak on behalf of the principal; and the lawyer represents a co-agent
(and not a sub-agent), even if selected and appointed by the leadership. See HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.5, p. 17-16; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, supra note
89, at 1.01, Cmt. f.  A communicated instruction between the principal and the co-agent
would bind the other co-agent, even if the direct agent disagreed with the instruction. See
id.  For the lawyer’s purposes, when meeting with the group as a whole, the agency status
of the leaders disappears, and they become, as a matter of agency law at least, simply
undifferentiated members of the group.  (They may have power within the group, of
course, but that is a separate matter.)
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group client without the use of constituents, and his analysis is invalu-
able on this topic.198  While Ellmann does not articulate a concern
about the finite population of the group client, and in particular with
the role of members (or purported members) absent from the meeting
itself (a topic we discuss in a moment199), and while he suggests a pro-
vocative tactic involving individual meetings between the lawyer and
the members200 (which we also address below201), his assessment of
the counseling process is quite insightful for our purposes.  Comparing
that interaction with the conventional Binder & Price model of client
counseling, Ellmann notes that the exploration with the client about
goals and what he calls the client’s “values”202 has to be different
when working in a meeting of many individuals who likely do not
share the same preferences and risk gauges.  His wise conclusion is
that the lawyer must be much more general and vague about that
topic compared to the work a lawyer would engage in with an individ-
ual client.203  The traditional Binder & Price counseling model sug-
gests that the lawyer explore with her client in some detail the client’s
goals and preferences as a necessary precursor to effective counsel-
ing.204  Ellmann observes that such a step is more challenging and
likely to be less effective when working with a larger group.205
Recognizing that difference, would a lawyer such as Kendra or-
ganize her counseling session in any different way if she were meeting
with the CHIA client group as a whole?  Recall the standard Binder &
Price protocol outlined earlier.206  Aside from managing the group
process (to be addressed in a moment), there is little reason to believe
that Kendra would orchestrate the meeting in any different way.  She
would not rely on the group to decide which alternative to discuss
first,207 but otherwise she would explain each option first descrip-
198 Ellmann, supra note 11, at passim.
199 See text accompanying notes 207-14 infra.
200 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1152 and n. 129.
201 See text accompanying notes 213-14 infra.
202 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1167.  Recall this work’s discomfort with the use of that
term to capture the idiosyncrasies of an individual client’s leanings and preferences. See
text accompanying note 43 supra.
203 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1140-41 (“[T]he goal of discussion must become the elicit-
ing of the major concerns of the group’s thinking, rather than the detailed variations.”).
204 See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 302-04; see also COCHRAN,
DIPIPPA & PETERS, supra note 19, at 148-49 (similar suggestion).
205 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1141 n. 103 (“[T]he task of identifying the pertinent or
material issues with a group seems bound to call for more limited attention to the details of
each individual member’s situation than a client-centered lawyer would provide to those
members one-on-one.”).
206 See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
207 See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 300-02 (recommending such a tactic
to bolster the lawyer’s neutral approach); COCHRAN, DIPIPPA & PETERS, supra note 19, at
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tively, and then normatively, examining the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each in as disciplined a way as possible to clarify the nature of
the choice before the client.208  While it is obviously true that some of
the group members may perceive a certain factor as a “pro” while
others may view that very same factor as a “con,” that reality is
neither problematic nor is it all that different from what happens
when a lawyer counsels an individual client.209  Once the client under-
stands, as best as the lawyer can achieve, the considerations, the “cli-
ent” must then decide, and the lawyer will follow the client’s self-
determined decision.
Therefore, it appears that a lawyer such as Kendra would not
counsel her group client in any appreciably different fashion when
working with the group as a whole, compared to her meeting with an
individual client.  But while the organizational structure may look
much like the conventional model, there are two ways in which Ken-
dra’s work will require some special consideration when her counsel-
ing involves the group as a whole.  The first of these concerns how
Kendra manages the group dynamics of the meeting, and whether
how she does so matters.  The second concern is how deferential, or
interventionist, Kendra ought to be when the group deliberates, com-
pared to her work with individuals and with a well-structured group.
Let us consider each in turn.  As we do so, we see that Stephen
Ellmann’s observations are very useful, even if we depart from his
conclusions in some fashion.
Ellmann views the problem of the group dynamics, and the par-
ticipatory quality of the deliberations, as a central concern for the law-
14-15 (noting, and criticizing, lawyers’ control tactic by choosing which alternative to dis-
cuss first).
208 LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 311-12.
209 The basic Binder & Price model is premised on the moral commitment to encourage
the client’s preferences to determine how the legal matter will proceed.  The lawyer does
not, by and large, label a factor as good or bad; the lawyer describes the factors and elicits
from her client the normative appreciation for that factor. See id., at 300-01.  With a group
client, it appears that the elegance of that model’s reasoning falters, because the same
client will see a given factor as simultaneously good (some members’ view) and bad (other
members’ view).  From the lawyer’s perspective, this need not be a problem and does not
interfere with the lawyer’s mission.  The diverging perspectives, if arrived at in good faith
and with respect, are exactly what a good deliberative process needs to discern the group’s
settled sentiment in the end. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 151 (2006) (describing the bene-
fits of pluralism and research showing that dissent contributes to better decisionmaking;
citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 27 (2003)).  And, frankly, the
divergence of normative reaction is not unusual in the case of individual clients either.  It is
common for a client to perceive both disadvantages and advantages in the same factor, and
feel torn as a result. See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 371-79 (describ-
ing clients experiencing difficulty deciding); LEHRER, supra note 28, at 199 (“Even the
most mundane decisions emerge from a vigorous cortical debate.”).
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yer working with a loosely-structured group client.210  He asserts that
the lawyer has an obligation to “assur[e] a baseline of democratic and
participative process within the group,”211 even if doing so might be
understood as an exercise in benevolent paternalism.212  To Ellmann,
that means intervening in the group meeting to insure that those
members who may be less vocal, or who may be intimidated by the
group’s leadership, have an opportunity to be heard.213  He even sug-
gests that the lawyer “might . . . make plain to each member of the
group that she is always available to talk to any one of them individu-
ally and in private.”214  In this way, he argues, the lawyer can best
serve her group client by fostering participatory, democratic
decisionmaking.
Ellmann’s observations trigger intriguing questions about the re-
sponsibilities of a lawyer for a loosely-structured group.  While
Ellmann’s subject is explicitly community group representation,215 his
arguments raise important questions about group representation gen-
erally.  Despite the power of his recommendations, it is difficult to
accept them as best practices principles for group work outside of the
community group setting.
Ellmann’s insistence that a lawyer for an entity foster democratic
and participatory processes for the client’s deliberation seems to con-
flate the understanding of the lawyer for an aggregate of clients and
that of the lawyer for an entity.  Putting aside the difficulty with his
quoted activist lawyer telling her group client members that she repre-
sents them individually, and not just the group’s leadership,216 the pre-
210 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1131-32.
211 Id. at 1145.
212 Id. at 1146 n. 113.
213 Id. at 1152.  Ellmann refers to the silent group members as “victims within the group
itself.” Id.
214 Id. (emphasis added).  Ellmann describes a practicing lawyer’s sentiments in support
of this recommendation: “[The lawyer] wants the individual members to know ‘that though
I’m representing the group, the group is composed of individuals, and I’m representing each
individual . . . and not, say, just the [group’s] leaders.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Ellmann’s private interview with attorney Judith Whiting).
215 Id. at 1104 (describing his context as “public interest lawyers’ representation of
groups,” which I infer to refer to community groups).
216 See text accompanying note 214 supra.  The quote from Judith Whiting captures a
sentiment which is at once understandable and, well, wrong as a matter of substantive law.
Assuming (as seems to be the case given Ellmann’s purposes in situating her quote) that
she has opted for entity representation (under Rule 1.13) and not joint representation
(under Rule 1.7), Whiting does not represent the individuals, just as she does not represent
the leadership.  Her desire to communicate to the rank and file of the community group
the sense that she has no special allegiance to the leadership but instead has a commitment
to the larger group is admirable, given the former’s potential distrust of the group’s hierar-
chy.  But to say that she does not have a special representational relationship with the
leadership is problematic, given the strictures of Rule 1.13. See MODEL RULES, supra note
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mise of the lawyer advising each constituent individually is difficult to
square with the underlying conception of entity, rather than aggre-
gate, representation.  If we assume that Ellmann’s lawyer would warn
each such individual group member appropriately of the lawyer’s fidu-
ciary obligations toward the group as a whole and not to that individ-
ual, as Rule 1.13(f) requires,217 the arrangement he proposes only
seems to work if the group as an entity has agreed to that process for
its decisionmaking.  If Ellmann is advocating that the lawyer suggest
such an arrangement on behalf of the group client, his argument is
difficult to square with the usual commitment to client autonomy.218
As above, let us return to our CHIA example to assist us to un-
derstand better the tensions Ellmann’s proposal evokes.  We envi-
sioned above a legal development which led Kendra to choose to meet
with the CHIA members as a group, including of course their ap-
pointed leaders Maritza, Sharon and Frank.219  Imagine, then, the fol-
lowing:  During the meeting of the seventeen homeowners, Kendra
carefully outlines for the group the choices available to it (go to the
press and risk ending negotiations or holding off on that tactic and
hoping for a breakthrough of the current deadlock), and orchestrates
a comparative discussion of the alternatives, with a goal of discerning
the group’s ultimate choice.  The three leaders, Maritza, Sharon and
52, at R. 1.13(a).  Whiting’s obligation as a lawyer would be to honor the wishes of the
leadership if, in fact, the leadership served as the proxy for the group. See FOX & MAR-
TYN, supra note 128, at 76.
217 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at  R.1.13(f) (requiring clarification to constitu-
ents who might misunderstand the lawyer’s role); ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note
70, at § 1.13-3, p. 575 (comparing the clarification duties to “Miranda” warnings); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at § 103, Cmt. e (describing the duty to clarify).
218 See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 520-21 (disagreeing with Ellmann on the
issue of the commitment to democratic processes, noting that some groups may flourish
without that quality).  Ellmann does not miss the prospect of irony in his combining a deep
commitment to autonomy with a suggestion that a lawyer urge a client group to be demo-
cratic and protective of the interests of the less vocal members.  Indeed, it is his express
effort to accommodate a commitment to individual autonomy and group autonomy that
leads Ellmann to his advocacy of intervention to encourage democratic processes. See
Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1132-33.
219 See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra.  It is difficult to imagine this meeting
without commenting upon two peripheral issues which a lawyer in Kendra’s position often
would confront.  The first is the prospect that only fifteen, say (or some number larger than
nine), of the seventeen group members attend the meeting.  While most lawyers would
proceed to counsel this significant subgroup of the whole, and treat its decisionmaking as
reliable and binding, the absence of some members raises certain conceptual difficulties for
the lawyer’s authority scheme.  The second issue concerns the presence of the three ap-
pointed leaders, Maritza, Sharon and Frank, at the meeting.  Because of the absence of a
formal structure within CHIA for appointed agents (even if we assume that the group has
anointed the three to serve as its spokespersons in their work with the group’s lawyer), the
lawyer would likely ignore, for this meeting’s purposes, the leadership authority of Ma-
ritza, Sharon and Frank, except insofar as they emerge as “organic” leaders during the
discussion and deliberation (which, again, seems likely).
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Frank, are quite active during the discussion.  Four other members
participate almost as much as the three leaders.  A few other home-
owners participate on occasion, and five members say nothing of sub-
stance, but appear to be engaged in the arguments and colloquies.
After ninety minutes of talk and debate, the group agrees, by consen-
sus (and not by vote), to call the nuisance-creator’s bluff and to in-
struct Kendra to go to the press with their concerns—the higher risk
option, in Kendra’s opinion.
As a matter of best practices, may we concluded that Kendra has
performed satisfactorily in her role as CHIA’s lawyer?  Note that she
did not meet with any of the homeowners individually or in private.
She did not intentionally call upon the five silent members to elicit
their views.  She did not ask for a vote.  She leaves the meeting know-
ing that it is possible that some members of CHIA would have chosen
a different option if it were solely their choice.  Do these factors imply
some professional negligence on her part?
Ellmann’s thesis implies that Kendra has breached a duty to some
of the individuals, but the thin story just described evidences, it seems,
very good lawyering on Kendra’s part.  Her work with the group ac-
cepted the organic dynamics of the group itself, and respected the
rights of the members to speak or not to speak, to dissent or not to
dissent, all while maintaining her allegiance to the group qua group,
and not as an aggregate of individual clients.220  This thin story in fact
suggests some dangers of a stance that would seek to protect expressly
the autonomy of the less active group members by separating them
from the group and encouraging a different kind of input from them.
A commitment by Kendra to encourage a deliberation not dominated
by the seven most vocal members, and one that required participation
by the less vocal, risks changing the group’s organic deliberative pro-
cess, and possibly distorting it.
Before moving to the second issue identified above, regarding
how deferential Kendra ought to be about the results of the group’s
deliberation, we must address a common variation of the topic we
have just covered.  The thin CHIA story described a somewhat typical
group meeting, with some members far more active and opinionated
than others, but one in which the veneer of consensus (and perhaps
true consensus) emerged in the end.  Similarly typical, though, is a
story with factions within the entity.  We cannot end our consideration
of the lawyer’s responsibility for loosely-structured, group-as-a-whole
decisionmaking without engaging the question of an entity divided
internally.
220 See FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 263-64; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Resp., Formal Op. 92-365 (1992).
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The faction question is much more difficult for a loosely-struc-
tured group like CHIA.  With a well-structured group, factions will
occur, of course, but the formal structures in place usually permit the
lawyer to honor the preexisting authority routes and, to some extent,
observe the faction disputes from a safe distance.221  An unincorpo-
rated association without such formal structures offers the lawyer
fewer safe harbors.  Let us consider some possible avenues for a law-
yer in that setting.
Consider, then, this variation of the thin story just described.  Im-
agine that at the community meeting of the seventeen homeowners, a
profound chasm emerges between two groups of homeowners.  The
three leaders and five other members urge the high risk option of pub-
licity, while the remaining nine members oppose that strategy ada-
mantly.  Kendra, for whatever significance this has, favors a more
moderate approach, concluding that the ultimatum idea is premature.
As a lawyer representing CHIA, Kendra must assess how she should
navigate this internal disagreement, and how she should interact with
the membership at the meeting (and thereafter, if the disagreement
persists).  Because CHIA is an informal group without by-laws or an
established hierarchical authority scheme, Kendra cannot simply defer
to previously agreed-upon default decisionmaking arrangements.
This example—which is not entirely implausible, of course—high-
lights the need for Kendra to have clarified her role with the unincor-
porated association as she began her representation.  CHIA is a
voluntary organization, and its members are free to leave.222  By
221 This Pollyanna-ish description obviously downplays considerably the tensions a law-
yer faces when reporting to management engaged in an intra-company squabble.  The cen-
tral point, though, seems well-supported—in a formal corporate or LLC setting, the lawyer
may rely on rules and schemes agreed to in more auspicious days, and honor the hierar-
chies set out in the corporate documents.  If lawyers find it difficult in those settings, a
lawyer encountering a similar squabble in a loosely-structured unincorporated association
will find her professional role tensions to be all that much more challenging. See, e.g.,
Simon, Intraclient Conflict, supra note 85, at 61-65 (describing the difficulties in corporate
settings generally).  Of course, lawyers in close corporations and small partnerships face
tensions very much like those in an unincorporated association.  For a discussion of the
close corporation and partnership role tensions, see id.; FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128,
at 230-35; James M. Fischer, Representing Partnerships: Who Is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAC.
L.J. 961 (1995); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Formal Op. 91-361 (1991) (partner-
ship representation).
222 Community lawyering scholarship often highlights the fluid nature of group member-
ship. See, e.g., Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice
Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV.
333, 343-44 (2009) (describing “clients in community, as bound together by economic and
social conditions”); Diamond, supra note 1, at 69-72 (“extemporaneous” groups have fluid
membership”); Zenobia Lai & Andrew Leong, From the Community Lawyers’ Lens: The
Case of the “Quincy 4” and Challenges to Securing Civil Rights for Asian Americans, 15
ASIAN AM. L.J. 73, 114 (2008) (fluid membership of a community group).
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agreeing to represent CHIA as an entity, Kendra and the homeowners
need to be certain about what “CHIA” means if, say, nine of its seven-
teen members opt to depart the organization.  If Kendra has clarity
about that, then she may follow the prescribed agreement.  The more
challenging question is what Kendra ought to do if that happenstance
has not been anticipated and the participants have not agreed in ad-
vance about how she will proceed.
It appears that Kendra’s only options are to clarify the nature of
the disagreements among the constituents of CHIA, attempt to medi-
ate a resolution among the homeowners and, if no such resolution
emerges, to withdraw as counsel for the organization.223  Does she
have professional discretion to take these steps?  She certainly has dis-
cretion, and likely an obligation, to clarify the nature of the internal
disagreements.  That mission represents her central role as counselor
for the loosely-structured organization.  The mediation option is also
likely a permissible tactic for Kendra, but it is not entirely self-evident
why this is so.224  While the Model Rules formerly recognized “inter-
mediation” among clients as an available role for a lawyer, through
what was known as Model Rule 2.2,225 the American Bar Associa-
tion’s Ethics 2000 Commission successfully recommended the repeal
of Rule 2.2.226  The Commission did not urge the repeal of the rule
because of any sentiment that intermediation among clients was for-
bidden to lawyers; instead, the Commission understood that any medi-
ation-type activity ought to be understood as a version of joint
representation and encompassed within the standard conflict of inter-
est rule, Model Rule 1.7.227  Thus, prevailing substantive law under-
223 “If neither the governing documents nor the applicable law provides guidance as to
who has the authority to direct the lawyer’s actions, and the internal dispute remains irre-
solvable so that continued representation of the organization becomes unreasonably diffi-
cult, the lawyer’s only recourse may be to withdraw.” Client Identity, Laws. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 91:2001 (2004), citing California State Bar Standing Comm. on Pro-
fessional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1994-137 (1994), 1994 WL 654491 (Cal.
St. Bar. Comm. Prof. Resp.).  This authority states that a lawyer “may” have to withdraw,
but it does not address any other alternative available to the lawyer.
224 Ellmann recommends mediation in the case of factions within a community group.
See Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1155.
225 See MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 2.2 (repealed in 2002).  Ellmann, writing in
1998, disagrees with a reliance upon Rule 2.2 as a basis under which to represent a group
client, for reasons developed in the text.  He does, though, agree that in the case of group
factionalism the lawyer may act as mediator within the group. See Ellmann, supra note 11,
at 1155.
226 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005, at 401-02 (2006).
227 Id.; see also Bennett, Creating a Client Consortium, supra note 9, at 83-85; Thomas E.
Rutledge & Phuc H. Lu, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Pitfalls for Counsel to a Busi-
ness Organization About to be Governed by a New Law, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 755, 777 and
n.89 (2007) (discussing intermediation among constituents of partnerships and LLCs).
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stands that a lawyer may mediate among her clients with proper
waivers in place.228
The difficulty in our applying the Rule 2.2 sentiment (via Rule
1.7) to Kendra is that she is not mediating among her several clients as
the rule contemplated; she does not represent any of the seventeen
homeowners.  Kendra, therefore, needs to understand her role from a
perspective other than the former Rule 2.2 or the current Rule 1.7.
She must understand her role as “corporate” counsel to include medi-
ation among the “corporate” constituents.  When working with an un-
incorporated association, especially an association such as CHIA
without elaborate processes in place for managing internal disagree-
ment, a lawyer must be able to play such a role, and no available sub-
stantive law authority exists to prohibit it.  While it may be true that
within a formal corporate environment a lawyer would not have the
authority, absent a specific request from the executive with the power
to do so, to work with the rank and file constituents to resolve their
disputes with management,229 that limitation does not seem to apply
to a lawyer meeting with the entire membership of a loosely-struc-
tured group client.  If Rule 1.6 creates the practical limit on the corpo-
rate lawyer’s ability to deal with rank and file constituents,230 the
group-as-a-whole meeting setting offers to Kendra at least implicit
permission from her client to disclose protected information to the
non-client constituents.231
228 The former Rule 2.2 permitted intermediation only with the consent of each affected
client after each understood the risks and benefits of the alternative lawyering stance
which intermediation represents. MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 2.2 and Cmt. 8 (1999
version).
229 As Larry Fox and Susan Martyn point out, a corporate lawyer does not have implicit
authority to discuss corporate matters with constituents, if only because of the restraints of
Model Rule 1.6 and the limits of the lawyer’s ability to discuss client matters with a non-
client. See FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 16-17, 70-71; MODEL RULES, supra note 52,
at R. 1.6. Cf. Bell v. Clark, 670 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind. 1996) (no duty of lawyer to inform
limited partners of developments because no attorney-client relationship with them); Mary
F. Radford, Ethical Challenges in Representing Families in Family Limited Partnerships, 35
ACTEC J. 2, 22 (2009) (noting a 1.6 issue when a limited partner seeks information from
partnership’s lawyer).
230 In fact, the corporate lawyer’s limitations come not just from the confidentiality obli-
gations but also from the lawyer’s fiduciary responsibility not to take actions without per-
mission, implicit or explicit, from the client. See FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 16-17.
231 For implied permission to disclose protected information, see MODEL RULES, supra
note 52, at  R. 1.6(a) and Cmt. 5.  The nature of Kendra’s confidentiality obligation to her
client CHIA is itself an intriguing consideration, one which yet again reminds us of the
need for a lawyer such as Kendra to establish clear protocols and authority schemes when
working with a loosely-structured group.  With a well-structured group, its lawyer may not
reveal information related to the representation to constituents without permission (ex-
plicit or implicit) from the management figure with authority to give such permission. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 50, at §96.  Absent such permission, a lawyer will have violated
Rule 1.6 and breached her fiduciary duty to her client.  In the case of a loosely-structured
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With permission in place to talk freely about client matters in
front of the constituents, no other role limitation would preclude Ken-
dra from mediating among those constituents, and some authority
supports her responsibility to do so.232  Ellmann suggests that when
engaged in that mediation the lawyer take pains not to be identified as
supporting one faction over the other,233 while Diamond and O’Toole
see that happenstance as often inevitable and not necessarily a bad
thing.234  The underlying commitments of the Binder & Price counsel-
ing model tend to confirm Ellmann’s worry about the lawyer’s expres-
sing her support for one bloc at the expense of another.235  But those
commitments, as we have seen, have less clout in the organizational
context.  The mandate within Rule 1.13 that the organizational lawyer
attend to “the best interest of the organization”236 informs the law-
yer’s duty to be a neutral, objective analyst, and might at times require
her to resist the arguments of some subsection of the membership and
to advocate the views of others.237  In the example of the CHIA fac-
group such as CHIA, Kendra might see the group’s appointed leaders, Maritza, Sharon
and Frank, as the management figures possessing such authority, but without knowing
more, Kendra may not be certain that the three leaders’ authority includes that subject as
well.  (Indeed, it is entirely possible that no one in the homeowners’ group thought very
much about that topic when appointing Maritza, Sharon and Frank to be the group liaison
to its lawyer.)  In light of that ambiguity, Kendra would have to exercise her best judgment,
discerned from group cues, about the implied authority she possesses to divulge informa-
tion when necessary on the group client’s behalf (such as, for instance, when negotiating
with the nuisance-creator).  In the context of the group-wide meeting that the text has been
discussing, the implicit permission to talk about client matters before the client constitu-
ents seems quite reliable.
232 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 59, at § 17.5 (“when a deep division of opinion
arises within the entity that threatens its well-being or even its survival, . . . the lawyer may
have to take action within the organization to resolve this matter, because this is in the best
interest of the organization”) (citing MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13 for the duty
to act in the “best interests of the organization”).  Diamond & O’Toole criticize the Hazard
& Hodes position for assuming in too facile a matter that the organization’s survival is
always in its best interest. See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 525.
233 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1160-61.
234 Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 527-28.
235 While Ellmann articulates a strong allegiance to a presumptively neutral stance on
the part of the lawyer representing the group client, see Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1106,
his objection to the lawyer’s siding openly with one faction stems more from his worry
about the effect on the group’s functioning, and on the feelings of the members of the less-
favored faction, that the lawyer’s stance would trigger. Id. at 1165-66.
236 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13(b).
237 Cf. COCHRAN, ET AL., supra note 19, at 12 (discussing the worrisome fact that corpo-
rate clients control lawyers, and suggesting a more active role for corporate counsel com-
pared to lawyers representing individuals); Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
91:2001 (2004) (“The corporation’s lawyer must avoid the trap of inevitably equating the
will of the majority with the corporation’s interest.  To do so runs counter to the bedrock
premise that the corporation is distinct from its owners and managers.”). But see id. (“The
lawyer faced with internecine conflict must remain neutral and refrain from taking sides in
factional differences.”).
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tions, though, there seems little reason for Kendra to consider siding
with either of the two blocs within the unincorporated association.238
The third option identified above as available to the lawyer when
confronted with deep divisions within her loosely-structured group
was to withdraw from the group representation.  Kendra has discre-
tion to do so if she concludes that the division within the group ren-
ders her representation “unavoidably difficult.”239  She will recognize,
though, that her withdrawal as counsel would likely mean the effective
end of CHIA as an unincorporated association operating as an en-
tity.240  That may be an inevitable development, but it ought to give
Kendra pause just the same.241
We are nearing the end of our examination of the lawyer’s re-
sponsibilities when counseling a loosely-structured group client.  We
have one final topic awaiting us:  What level of deference ought the
lawyer pay to the group’s deliberation?  Put another way, how in-
terventionist may the lawyer be when counseling the group as a
whole?  This question emerges from the context of our earlier discus-
sions about neutrality and directiveness.  We recognized the baseline
moral commitment to neutrality when working with an individual cli-
ent, out of respect for the individual client’s personal preferences and
risk aversion.242  We then concluded that the moral calculus changes
when the lawyer counsels a constituent of an entity client, with even
238 If we accept that Kendra might have the responsibility in some contexts to support
one faction in an internecine organizational battle if, in her judgment, the best interests of
the organization so require, that precondition does not apply to the hypothetical disagree-
ment we have created for CHIA.  As we have seen, both of the options available to CHIA
are lawful and permitted; they differ only in the level of risk assigned to each.  It would be
unusual for a lawyer to intervene in that kind of client decision, whether individual or
corporate.  In many ways, the choice of strategy vis-a`-vis the nuisance creator resembles a
business decision, which corporate lawyers are taught to respect and for which they defer
to management. See, e.g., FOX & MARTYN, supra note 128, at 16.
239 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at  R. 1.16(b)(5). See also California State Bar Stand-
ing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1994-137 (1994), 1994
WL 654491 (Cal. St. Bar. Comm. Prof. Resp.).
240 This is a practical consideration, not a legal one.  If Kendra concludes that the group
is irrevocably split, so much so that there is no consensus on which she can rely for her
legal work on its behalf, she may of course invoke Rule 1.16 and end the representation.
But that leaves the seventeen homeowners without entity counsel, and unlikely to agree on
an avenue for retaining new counsel.  Our hypothetical is too thin to speculate whether the
relief sought by the homeowners may be obtained by members of CHIA pursuing their
remedies separately; if so, CHIA may end but the homeowners may abate the nuisance
through less coordinated means.  For a discussion of this kind of internal struggle, see Wil-
liam B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and
Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997).
241 See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 521-25 (discouraging withdrawal for its
effect of denying the splintered group the benefit of the lawyer’s experience with the group
and her wisdom about its mission).
242 See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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less deference due when the constituent represents a loosely-struc-
tured group or unincorporated association.243  Critical to the moral
analysis was the recognition that the constituent, the person speaking
with the lawyer, was not the client whose preferences need to be
respected and only possessed a presumptive right to express the entity
client’s preferences and comfort level with risk.  The fact that the con-
stituent was at best an imperfect proxy for the true client served as a
morally relevant consideration in discerning the responsibility of the
lawyer during the counseling process.
When the lawyer counsels the group as a whole, the moral
calculus changes again.  The setting now resembles far more closely
that of a lawyer with her individual client.  The morally germane
proxy element is now gone, and the group’s choice—putting aside, for
now, any consideration of its being a “community group” with
whatever added commitments that designation might imply—accu-
rately represents the client’s wishes.  Note that this is a separate ques-
tion from that of how the lawyer discerns the group’s wishes, a matter
we encountered above.  But once discerned, or in the process of its
development, the lawyer has little moral right to influence its
direction.
Ellmann’s review of the group counseling process concurs with
this conclusion.244  His arguments rest not only on the fact that the
client as a whole is expressing its preferences,245 but upon a more sub-
tle realization as well, one that serves as a contrast to, rather than a
similarity with, individual client counseling.  With an individual client,
once the lawyer understands the client’s needs, preferences and com-
fort with risk, the lawyer might engage the client in a relatively active
and even challenging fashion to account for any perceived disconnect
between the strategy chosen by the client and the expressed commit-
ments.246  When working with a group client, Ellmann notes, the law-
243 See text accompanying notes 96-106 supra.
244 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1164.
245 Recall that Ellmann’s analysis of group client decisionmaking treats the default ori-
entation as a lawyer working with a group as a whole, rather than the default orientation
adopted in this Article, which assumes that any functioning group client will need to have
some rudimentary bureaucratic structure in place, and therefore the lawyer will work most
often with constituent/leaders.  Recall also the Diamond and O’Toole observation that
most community groups will not be, and ought not be, “bureaucratic” groups as this Article
suggests. See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 514-15.  For reasons developed
throughout this article, that sanguine stance on the part of O’Toole and Diamond, while
admirable, cannot square with the demands of the law of lawyering.
246 See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 368-69; KRIEGER & NEW-
MANN, supra note 19, at 273-74; COCHRAN, DIPIPPA & PETERS, supra note 19, at 155.  The
lawyer has no obligation to insist that the client choose the strategic option which best
comports with the client’s expressed preferences and penchants, of course, or to influence
the client to do so.  The client’s actual choice may express those preferences more soundly
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yer can never be confident enough about the group’s commitments,
preferences, and risk comfort, precisely because the group members
will have a multitude of opinions and differing feelings.  Lacking a
sufficiently full understanding of the client’s true commitments, the
most effective role for the lawyer might be to oversee the decision-
making process within the group to ensure that the membership’s de-
cisions are fair and coherent.247  The lawyer, by this reasoning, would
have little or no responsibility for the content of the group’s decisions.
Two considerations might diminish the power of this conclusion,
however.  The first is equally applicable to a lawyer’s work with an
individual client.  Most observers agree that lawyers bear some re-
sponsibility for the moral consequences of the work they perform for
and with their clients.248  The second consideration applies to organi-
zational clients.  As Richard Painter notes, because of the nature of
entity clients operating through constituents, the relationship between
the group’s decisionmaking and the lawyer’s input is quite “interde-
pendent.”249  In Painter’s words,
[D]ebate over the relative merits of lawyer and client auton-
omy may be moot.  Corporations are not autonomous, but rather
corporate decisions are made by people standing behind the corpo-
rate entities: directors, officers, employees, and lawyers.  Lawyers’
choice is not whether to participate in making clients’ decisions, but
what type of participation theirs will be.250
than the client’s ex ante articulation of them. See LEHRER, supra note 28, at 232-38; Kruse,
Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 422-23.  But nor should the lawyer ignore an appar-
ent inconsistency between what the client professes to want and what the client then
chooses. See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, at 398-99.
247 Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1164 (‘the role of [the lawyer’s] advice frequently may be
more to inform further debate than to bring the [group] client to a quick resolution of
uncertainty”).
248 A widely accepted exception to the standard conception of the lawyer’s respecting
client decisionmaking is when the client chooses an unlawful or an immoral course of ac-
tion.  In that setting, a lawyer has the responsibility to intervene, and that intervention, of
course, is not an exercise in paternalism. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE:
AN ETHICAL STUDY 160-74 (1988); Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired
Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1317 (2006). See also LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 391-93 (counsel-
ing clients about moral issues).
249 Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507 (1994).
250 Id. at 517.  Many observers agree, both in the conventional corporate arena, see, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Someplace Between Philosophy and Economics: Legitimacy and
Good Corporate Lawyering, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1615 (2006) [hereinafter, Langevoort,
Good Corporate Lawyering], and in the community lawyering context, see, e.g., Diamond
& O’Toole, supra note 2.
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IV. COUNSELING COMMUNITY GROUP CLIENTS
To appreciate adequately the counseling responsibilities for law-
yers working with community groups, our preliminary aim has been to
unpack those responsibilities as they apply to group clients generally.
We have seen so far that a lawyer representing a group client must
attend to a number of important strategic and ethical considerations.
To complete our mission, we now inquire about the further special
responsibilities, if any there are, for lawyers whose group clients are
community groups.
This part concludes that the community quality matters.  Once we
articulate what we mean by the term “community group,” we will see
that a lawyer for such a group will find her role altered in three possi-
ble ways.  First, because most community groups share (and often ex-
pressly commit to) a public mission, its counsel might assume
responsibilities different from lawyers representing clients, whether
group or individual, whose mission is principally private.  Second,
when representing a community group, including one that retains a
private mission, a lawyer might need to attend in a different way to
the oppression and structural power deficits of the group’s members.
Finally, and related to the second point but seemingly a different man-
ner, a community group counsel might respond to her group client’s
experience of oppression in ways which appear less neutral and less
deferential, in an effort to establish more favorable conditions for its
members’ eventual autonomy development.  As the discussion below
will show, these three observations are each quite tentative and con-
tested.  We begin, however, with the preliminary definitional question.
A. Defining “Community Groups”
For purposes of this discussion, we may consider a group client to
constitute a “community group” if its members are economically and
politically powerless and have joined together for collective aims re-
lated in some way to their plight of powerlessness.251  This definition
encompasses all kinds of underrepresented and oppressed groups.
The counsel for the community groups most likely will be in some
fashion “public interest” lawyers252 (including law firm lawyers serv-
251 See, e.g., Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1, at 472; Diamond &
O’Toole, supra note 2, at 483; Richard G. Lorenz, Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors, 33
URB. LAW. 45, 79 (2001) (noting the powerlessness of community groups) (citing LAU-
RENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: HOW TO AVOID
ESCALATING CONFRONTATION, NEEDLESS COSTS, AND UNNECESSARY LITIGATION 17, 21
(2000)).
252 See  Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1105 (focusing on public interest lawyers, whom he
describes as “lawyers whose work is aimed at achieving social reform on behalf of people
who would otherwise lack adequate representation”).
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ing in a pro bono capacity253), but not necessarily so, as some groups
fitting this description will hire private counsel for its legal work.  For
our purposes, it does not matter whether the lawyers whose work this
part addresses are privately paid or publicly- or foundation-funded.
The definition here excludes, of course, most purely private
groups which have banded together for private gain.  While the earlier
discussion of group representation applied equally well to profit-
driven business entities and activist civic organizations, this discussion
excludes the former organizations.  Some groups banding together for
private gain will fit within the definition, though, such as a low-income
tenants’ association254 or even some merchants associations.255  The
critical question is whether the membership consists of those without
a fair share of economic or political power, and whether the aims of
the group include some increased share of assets, wealth, or power.
The definition used here easily includes the client groups which are
the subject of the community lawyering literature.256
The definition articulated here elides many rich and fascinating
debates within the community lawyering scholarship.  At least for def-
initional purposes, it does not matter whether the community group is
“representative” of the community for whom it purports to speak.257
(That factor may matter, however, for some parts of our consideration
of the lawyer’s responsibilities.)  Nor does it matter for our purposes
what we define as a relevant “community”—whether a geographic lo-
253 See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004); Scott
L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory and
Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 621 (2009).
254 See, e.g., Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 490-91 (describing a building-wide
group of tenants as a community group).
255 See Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1, at 472 (noting that most
merchant associations do not qualify as public charities despite their connection to commu-
nity economic development).  Several civic improvement organizations with “Main Streets
Program”-related missions have qualified for 501(c)(3) status. See, e.g., Matthew J.
Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood Councils: A New
Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 175 (2008) (describing neighbor-
hood councils organized as 501(c)(3) entities), citing JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE RE-
BIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 58-59 (1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2004) (the
term “charitable” includes “promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to ac-
complish [such] purposes . . . [as] (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; . . . or (iv) to combat
community deterioration”).
256 For a sampling of that literature discussing the types of groups described here, see
Alfieri, (Un)Covering Identity, supra note 97, at 831; Diamond, supra note 1, at 75;
Ellmann, supra note 11, at 1111; Marshall, supra note 1, at 173; Rubenstein, supra note
240; Seielstad, supra note 5, at 449; Daniel Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Commu-
nity Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 233 (1999); White, Facing
South, supra note 3, at 814.
257 See Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing that tension
in her clinical work).
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cale or some other basis to apply that term.258  The definition chosen
here applies regardless of where one comes out on that issue.
With this understanding of a “community group,” let us now in-
vestigate the role responsibilities for the counsel for such a group,
building upon the previous development of group representation du-
ties generally.
B. Counseling Groups with a Public Mission
Most (although clearly not all) community groups possess a pub-
lic mission.  For such a client, its membership has formed the entity259
in order to attain some benefits beyond those of the individual entity’s
formal constituents.  Many of those groups will have made their public
missions explicit and non-negotiable, by forming a state nonprofit cor-
poration and seeking tax exempt status from the Internal Revenue
Service.260  Not all nonprofits qualify as community groups, of course,
and not all community groups qualify as nonprofits, but a significant
subset of community groups will fit within this rubric.  Let us consider,
then, whether the fact of such a public mission affects the counseling
strategies of the lawyer for the organization.
Given the analytical and moral premises upon which the previous
counseling practices have been constructed—beginning with an indi-
vidual client, and then comparing that to a constituent of an entity,
and to the entity membership as a whole—a lawyer representing a
community group client possesses some discretion, and perhaps an ob-
ligation, to intervene more actively in the decisionmaking of that cli-
ent than in any of the previous contexts, in order to ensure the client’s
faithful pursuit of its public mission.  The default commitment to def-
erence and neutrality which characterizes the conventional counseling
models rests on a coherent anti-paternalist sentiment, one grounded
in deep respect for the autonomy of the private actor clients.  The
258 As Nancy Cook has written, the concept of community is “vaguely defined and often
only vaguely understood.”  Nancy Cook, Looking for Justice on a Two-Way Street, 20
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 169, 191 (2006).  For others who wrestle with this topic, see Sameer
M. Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 356 (2008);
Brodie, supra note 222, at 343-44; John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional
Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1927, 1937 (1999); Diamond, supra note 1, at 113-14; Robin S. Golden, To-
ward a Model of Community Representation for Legal Assistance Lawyering: Examining
the Role of Legal Assistance Agencies in Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 17
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 527, 531 (1998).
259 As the earlier discussion has shown, we must consider all community groups to be a
form of “entity,” even if the group is a loosely-structured entity. See text accompanying
notes 123-34 supra.
260 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
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notion of respect for a client’s “idiosyncrasies”261 exemplifies that
dedication to autonomy.  With community groups devoted to an ex-
plicit public mission, the autonomy premise weakens considerably, as
does the notion of honoring idiosyncrasy.262
The idea of a more activist lawyer role in this context garners
support not just from the theories upon which counseling best prac-
tices are built, but on another public policy argument as well.  William
Simon, who advocates the more general position that entity lawyers
ought to play a more activist role in discerning the most appropriate
stance for the organizational client, points out that charitable organi-
zations in particular can benefit from a lawyer’s oversight.263  Simon’s
point is that, because constituents of a charitable organization may not
always be faithful to the charitable purpose of the entity, the lawyer’s
role ought to incorporate oversight of that commitment and interven-
tion when necessary.  He writes, “Given the relative weakness of mon-
itoring [by the IRS or state officials], it is arguable that the
professional responsibilities of lawyers are exceptionally important in
this sphere.”264
In light of Simon’s public policy argument, it is important to dis-
tinguish three counseling contexts for a lawyer representing a non-
profit community group.  First, to fit Simon’s argument into our
analytic fabric, it is not terribly controversial to assert that the lawyer
representing a tax-exempt organization may resist her client’s constit-
uents’ plans when those plans breach the entity’s duties under applica-
261 See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
262 The arguments here intentionally distinguish a client’s strategy to achieve private
gain and a strategy to achieve public benefits.  Several colleagues remain skeptical about
that distinction.  The arguments rest on a well-accepted premise within American law that
individuals may act rashly or foolishly when their own property is at stake, and when they
do so knowingly.  That commitment is foundational to the anti-paternalist strain in Ameri-
can law. See Spiegel, supra note 6, at 74-77; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131-32 (1986).  The argument then asserts a
well-established converse proposition, holding that none of us may act rashly or foolishly
with others’ property to which we have been entrusted. See, e.g., Joseph T. Walsh, The
Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 333-35 (2002).  The distinction,
then, seems a sound one.
The difficulty arises from my applying that distinction to organizations.  In organiza-
tions with shareholders distinct from management, the lawyer’s responsibilities approach
those I apply to community groups with public missions. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrific-
ing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 756-76 (2005) (acknowl-
edging the traditional commitment to shareholders but advocating a broader duty);
Langevoort, Good Corporate Lawyering, supra note 250, at 1618-20.  In smaller, close cor-
porations, the right to act rashly might be more easily understood.
263 Simon, Intraclient Conflict, supra note 85, at 112-13.  For a discussion of Simon’s
“Framework of Dealing” approach to entity representation, see text accompanying note
107 supra.
264 Id. at 113.
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ble IRS guidelines.  All counseling models understand that respect for
autonomy does not include respect for law-breaking,265 and it is hard
to imagine a best practices protocol which would discourage a lawyer
from such resistance with charitable organizations.266
Second, to the extent that Simon’s suggestion might be seen as
applying to entity constituents’ rather direct breach of fiduciary re-
sponsibility or federal law commitments, the proposal advanced here
is broader than that.  The intervention and diminished deference sup-
ported here are not triggered only by lawlessness.  A lawyer repre-
senting a community group has discretion to intervene with, and
engage, her client constituents about the wisdom of their pursuit of
the entity’s public mission.  Unlike the case with an individual client, a
community group lawyer need not be agnostic about issues of civic
policy, community needs, or the public interest.  It may be true, of
course, that a lawyer may lack any such wisdom or expertise in any
particular setting, in which case the lawyer would assume a conven-
tional, neutral counseling stance.267  But nothing in the theory under-
lying effective counseling strategy requires that neutrality as a matter
of course.  If the lawyer possesses expertise about the public mission
strategy about which the constituents needs to decide, her client is
better off having heard the lawyer’s opinion.
The third point follows from the second to suggest a critical dis-
tinction, one related closely to the observations appearing in the next
Subpart.  There may exist a tension within the community group rep-
265 See, e.g., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 328-30; KRIEGER & NEW-
MANN, supra note 19, at 277. See generally, Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of
the Law: An Exercise in Jurisprudence and the Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545
(1995).
266 Some prominent law-and-economics scholars may disagree on this score, at least
with for-profit organizations beholden to shareholders.  Judge Frank Easterbrook and Pro-
fessor Daniel Fischel famously argue that corporate management has a duty to violate the
law when doing so benefits the firm. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Anti-
trust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (“[M]anagers not
only may but should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).  For an in-depth
critique of the Easterbrook & Fischel position, see GREENFIELD, supra note 209, at 73-75.
The Easterbrook & Fischel thesis seems to have little applicability to management of a
nonprofit organization, of course.  That interesting theoretical debate notwithstanding, the
substantive law of lawyering generally prohibits lawyer participation in wrongdoing, and
certainly permits lawyer resistance of wrongdoing. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 50,
at § 94(2); MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.2 (lawyer may not assist client in crime or
fraud); R. 2.1 (lawyer may counsel a client about moral and prudential considerations);
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Re-
sponsibility for Client Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993).
267 For a comparable protocol regarding ethical decisionmaking generally, see William
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that
the more reliable a law provision’s purposes are, the less responsibility a lawyer possesses
for achieving justice, and the less reliable the scheme, the greater the responsibility of the
lawyer).
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resentation between the most effective pursuit of its public mission
and the effectiveness, solidarity, or sustainability of the community
group.268  This tension is likely to arise especially within community
groups whose members are poor, less sophisticated, or victims of
structural oppression.269  It is not at all implausible for a lawyer to
conclude that her intervention on policy and mission issues adds sub-
stantial value to the group’s deliberation about those issues.  The
counseling model outlined here permits such intervention on the
“public mission” front, but such intervention may have serious disrup-
tive consequences for the group process and cohesion.270  A responsi-
ble lawyer will exercise her discretion delicately to minimize the latter
effect while attempting to achieve the former goal.
C. Building Community
This subpart addresses from a “best practices” perspective a vi-
brant theme within the community lawyering literature—the responsi-
bility of the counsel for community organizations to foster solidarity
within the group, to promote democracy,271 and to “build commu-
nity.”272  Tellingly, but not surprisingly, one does not encounter those
exhortations in the scholarship about corporate lawyering gener-
ally.273  The question we confront here is whether what we might call
268 I understand this to be the argument proffered by Diamond and O’Toole. See Dia-
mond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 482.
269 This assertion requires delicate clarification, as well as acknowledgement of its tenta-
tive quality.  To the extent that achievement of certain public policy objectives depends
upon expertise, sophistication, and experience, it is neither unfair nor narrow-minded to
predict that an educated lawyer is as likely to possess those qualities as persons with less
education, sophistication, and experience.  Recognizing that, though, does not imply a dis-
respect for the insights and experience of those community members who have suffered
the most as a result of the policies which the group seeks to change.  This is a central
mission of Gerald Lo´pez’s writing. See LO´PEZ, supra note 1, at 66-74; see also, Anthony
Alfieri, Practicing Community, supra note 2.
270 See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at 483; Shah, supra note 256, at 236-40.  For a
thoughtful assessment of the lawyer’s role in working with grass-roots organizations in the
Third World, see David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for
Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
271 See Bennett, Little Engines that Could, supra note 1, at 479-82; Lucie White, “De-
mocracy” in Development Practice: Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073,
1076 (1997).
272 See Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for Im-
poverished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 639 (1994); Seielstad, supra note 5.
273 In some respects, one encounters the opposite sentiments—that corporate clients
have so much power as to be dangerous, and so corporate lawyers ought to serve as gate-
keepers and monitors. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corpo-
rate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethics Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143 (2002); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185 (2003); Susan P. Koniak, Corporate Fraud: See, Lawyers, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
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for convenience this “empowerment theory”274 affects in a tangible
way the counseling responsibilities of a lawyer representing a commu-
nity group.  Note the difference between this issue and the previous
one.  This question applies to all community groups, including those
which would not qualify for tax-exempt status because the member-
ship aims to produce a form of “private inurement.”275  If the lawyer
possesses some special commitments, they will not emerge from the
public mission quality of the group client’s existence.
It is useful to separate the strands of arguments in place within
the empowerment theory claims.  One central insight within the em-
powerment theory is the observation that community lawyers risk re-
producing hierarchy and institutionalizing oppression by their habits
of defining client needs within narrow legal categories, exploiting legal
expertise to minimize the participation of citizens, and otherwise dom-
inating or distorting group processes.276  That insight is powerful, not
terribly in dispute, and, seemingly, addressed conceptually by the stra-
tegic and moral considerations central to all of the preceding discus-
sion.  In that sense, it is easy to embrace this critical stance.
Community lawyers will adopt a respectful and humble posture in
their work with their clients.
But do the critics expect more?  Consider one possible implica-
tion of the empowerment theory stance.  Just as powerless group
members ought not to be dominated by the professional lawyers in
suits, it is similarly true (one might infer) that powerless group mem-
bers ought not to be dominated by the more vocal and educated lead-
POL’Y 195 (2003) (all commenting on that theme in the context of the Enron matter).
Many observers perceive the Sarbanes-Oxley scheme as a manifestation of that worry. See,
e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law:
A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); James Fanto, A Social Defense
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517 (2008); Peter Kostant, From Lapdog to
Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 535 (2008); Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007).
274 The “empowerment” term is commonly used as a moral commitment of progressive
lawyers. See, e.g., Piomelli, supra note 1; Spencer Rand, Teaching Law Students to Practice
Social Justice: An Interdisciplinary Search for Help Through Social Work’s Empowerment
Approach, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 459 (2006); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community
Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 455 (1994); Shah, supra note 256.
275 The Internal Revenue Service will deny tax exempt status to a purported nonprofits
if the entity permits “private inurement”—that is, that constituents will receive some pri-
vate gain from the entity’s work. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“no part of the net earnings [may]
inure[ ] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual”); see Darryll K. Jones, The
Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA.
TAX REV. 575 (2000) (examining that factor).
276 See Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note 1, at 2592-95; Ascanio Piomelli, Ap-
preciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 437-42 (2000).
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ers within the community.277  To the extent that corporate law
principles applied to the community group setting require the lawyer
to honor the instructions of the entity’s “duly authorized constitu-
ents,”278 the paradigmatic counseling responsibility of a community
group lawyer might serve to “reproduce hierarchy,”279 even when the
lawyer adopts the respectful and humble posture just described.  The
empowerment theory might suggest to a community lawyer that she
resist autocratic leadership (even if “duly authorized”) and work more
directly with the membership.  Indeed, we have seen such suggestions
before in the context of group clients generally, and rejected them as
inconsistent with the governing ethical regime.280
We have now identified what seems to be a tension between the
moral obligation of a community lawyer to foster membership power
and the legal/ethical obligation that the lawyer respect the hierarchy
within the organization.  Of course, if leadership is committed to
membership empowerment, the tension dissipates.  If leadership is un-
receptive to active membership involvement (whether for pragmatic
or less honorable reasons), the principles we discerned above showing
an entity’s lawyer having greater discretion to intervene in counseling
a constituent would apply here.  The persistent critique of the empow-
erment theory serves a beneficial purpose for the community lawyer,
serving as a constant reminder that her mission with her group client
is both to respect the instructions of leadership but always with an eye
toward increasing the felt stake of the membership in the resulting
processes and decisions.
Let us, then, address one further implication of the empowerment
theory critique before we move to our final subpart on the community
group topic.  The previous subpart noted that a lawyer working with a
“public mission” community group (such as a recognized nonprofit)
possesses both discretion and, at times, an arguable obligation to en-
courage the entity client to achieve its public mission, even if the con-
stituents of the entity might disagree with the lawyer’s proposals.
That subpart noted the tension between that interventionist possibility
and the empowerment theory stance, since lawyer intervention tends
to imply some lawyer control and possible domination.281  The present
discussion regarding the tension between following the wishes of the
entity’s “duly authorized constituents” and empowering the member-
277 Diamond & O’Toole recognize this risk. See Diamond & O’Toole, supra note 2, at
535-36.
278 MODEL RULES, supra note 52, at R. 1.13(a).
279 Brodie, supra note 222, at 375; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Repro-
duction of Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 40, 50 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
280 See text accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
281 See text accompanying notes 268-70 supra.
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ship invites further consideration of the “public mission” posture.
Imagine the following, then: The nonprofit entity’s leadership
recommends a certain action as the best avenue to achieve its public
mission, but (as the lawyer discovers) many within the community
group membership disagree.  The lawyer, for her part, believes that
leadership is correct on this call, and that the dissenting members,
while acting in good faith, are wrong.  The responsibility of the lawyer
in this thin story is quite clear—her legal obligations and her moral
obligations are in sync, and she may respect the instructions of leader-
ship.  In doing so, though, the lawyer has not fostered the power of the
membership very well, and, indeed, has used her expertise and her
professional position to exert some control over the members.  She
therefore accepts critique on the empowerment theory front.  The
point is that empowerment as a goal is one among many, and, while it
will always serve as a critical factor in the lawyer’s moral calculus, it is
not a trump.
D. Alienation, Oppression, and Positive Freedom
A simplified view of the empowerment theory and the standard
client-centered approach to client counseling shows substantial har-
mony among their respective goals.  The Binder & Price model funda-
mentally resists techniques of lawyer control;282 the critics espousing
the empowerment theory rail against the persistence of lawyer domi-
nation, especially with poor and subordinated clients.283  A more so-
phisticated perspective on the lawyer domination topic, however,
questions that apparent symmetry.  The “refined view” of the critical
perspective understands the “autonomy” goals of both projects as not
equating to what a client (whether group or individual) happens to
choose.  A good faith lawyer, as a fiduciary for her client’s genuine
needs and desires, may resist actively that client’s immediate choices.
If that sounds like a form of lawyer domination—well, perhaps it is,
but it may not necessarily be morally troublesome.
Katherine Kruse is one commentator adopting the more sophisti-
cated perspective.284  In her critique of the client-centered model of
counseling, Kruse notes the importance of both “negative lib-
erty”285—the right to do as one chooses—and “positive freedom”286—
the opportunity to exercise autonomy by reducing constraints on
available choices.  As Kruse explains, the Binder & Price model un-
282 See LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 13, at 4-8.
283 See note 276 supra.
284 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 404-12.
285 Id. at 410.
286 Id. at 404.
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dersells autonomy if it only focuses on the negative freedom, aiming
to create space for clients to make their own choices.  A better prac-
tice, at times, would suggest that the lawyer increase a client’s auton-
omy by actively working to alter the client’s “attitudes, beliefs, or
unrealistic expectations.”287  In her development of the positive free-
dom conception, Kruse relies on the ideas of William Simon, a propo-
nent of a more activist counseling model intended to augment the
opportunities for oppressed clients.288  Simon, in turn, builds upon the
“refined” view of paternalism suggested by Duncan Kennedy.289
Both Kruse and Simon accept that lawyers working with commu-
nity groups might have a professional obligation to intervene actively
with their clients to assist the clients to get things right.  As Kruse
describes it, a “client empowerment” approach to representation (an
approach Kruse finds as “particularly attractive to lawyers working
with communities of poor client or of battered women”290) might, in
appropriate contexts, reject a client’s “[s]tated [w]ishes” to overcome
“[c]lient misdiagnosis of what the client ‘really wants.’”291  Gary Bel-
low concurred in this outlook for lawyers working with oppressed
communities.  For Bellow, community lawyers are “not detached pro-
fessionals offering advice and representation regardless of the conse-
quences; we saw ourselves as responsible for, and committed to,
shaping those consequences.”292
We might call this version of the empowerment theory the “posi-
tive freedom” stance, using Kruse’s term.293  Note that much of the
mainstream empowerment theory and community lawyering scholar-
ship arguments are initially hard to square with the positive freedom
stance.294  A best-practices approach to counseling community groups
must acknowledge the prevailing voice within progressive scholarship
warning community lawyers against committing “interpretive vio-
lence” against poor clients295 and “subordinat[ing] their clients’ per-
287 Id. at 420.
288 See Simon, Mrs. Jones’s Case, supra note 103, at 222-24; Simon, Dark Secret, supra
note 34, at 1114.
289 Kennedy, supra note 33.
290 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 423.
291 Id. at 420.
292 Bellow, supra note 33, at 300.  Bellow elaborated: “Alliance is a better term than
client-centered.  It permits us to talk seriously about purposive judgment—when and
whether to intervene or to seek influence.” Id. at 303.
293 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 404.
294 Indeed, for that very reason William Simon disdainfully refers to the positive free-
dom stance (although in quite different terms) as the “Dark Secret” of the progressive
scholarship community.  Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 34, at 1102.
295 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning the Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. REV. 2107, 2123 (1991).
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ceptions of need to the lawyers’ own agendas for reform,”296 while
noting that “quite a lot of oppression happens in the name of abstract
humanist values such as democracy, autonomy and equality.”297  A
best-practices approach must at once accept that “the practice of law
always involves exercise of power,”298 especially with marginalized cli-
ents, but that community lawyers must exercise that power without
committing interpretive violence or “reproducing hierarchy.”299
Advocates of a “collaborative” approach to community lawyering
acknowledge this tension.300  Missing from those accounts, though, are
vivid stories of its practiced implementation.  The accounts succeed in
demonstrating collaboration, and respect for the views of client group
members as more reliable than the purported expertise from the pro-
fessionals.301  But implicit in the collaborative models, and explicit in
the positive freedom stance, is the understanding that marginalized
clients might get things wrong, that their good-faith lawyers might dis-
cern the clients’ “self deception”302 and their “unrealistic” assessments
of their “real needs and interests,”303 and that those lawyers have an
obligation to nurture the client’s autonomy by resisting the client’s
expressed wishes.  The literature needs more and better stories show-
ing how the lawyer accomplishes that end without succumbing to the
regnant ideas of the lawyer as expert and savior.
While the positive freedom stance may remain a relatively “thin”
phenomenon within the critical lawyering scholarship, the proponents
of collaborative lawyering (a group not necessarily aligned with the
positive freedom advocates) do offer useful insights that might begin
to shape a best-practices approach for working with community
groups.  The best collaborative lawyering writers stress the qualities of
humility, transparency, and respect when working with marginalized
clients.  In a showing of deep respect for victims of oppression, the
writers emphasize the strengths within the groups to hear honest opin-
ions, recommendations and proposals from their lawyers without fee-
bly surrendering to the experts’ views.  Those attributes may inform
our effort to understand a practiced approach to the positive freedom
stance.  That stance tells us that community lawyers who discern “un-
296 Lucie E. White, Mobilizations on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Cli-
ents to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88).
297 Steven L. Winter, Cursing the Darkness, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1115, 1129 (1994).
298 Bellow, supra note 33, at 301.
299 See note 276 supra.
300 See, e.g., Piomelli, supra note 276, at 437-40.
301 See, e.g., LO´PEZ, supra note 1; Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, supra note 1, at 2573-
74; Shah, supra note 256, at 221.
302 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 424.
303 Id. at 420, 423.
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realistic” expectations and short-sighted choices within their client
groups may possess a moral duty to persuade their clients to arrive at
better decisions.  In doing so, though, the lawyers need to exhibit
humility and tentativeness—qualities which in a different context an
observer has called “informed not-knowing.”304
A more intriguing question for the positive freedom stance con-
siders the limits of a lawyer’s manipulation in the interests of aiding
clients who are “blinded by the passions of the moment to their long-
term interest or deeper values,”305 or “who are alienated from them-
selves, or in the grip of self-deception.”306  If we accept the premise
that a lawyer owes her client (including, notably, a community group
client) her assistance to increase the client’s autonomy and positive
freedom, and if we accept that lawyers have a reliable capacity to dis-
cern when those circumstances exist (and, further, to differentiate
those contexts from the very different situations of the lawyer simply
disagreeing about tactical issues, or having her own conflicting inter-
ests), then we must confront what it is that the lawyer may do to
achieve the increase in client autonomy.  If the collaborative tech-
niques of honest conversation do not work, the lawyer might actively
manipulate or cajole her client to proceed as the lawyer understands
the client ought to proceed.
Here is where the positive freedom stance needs rich stories.
Without thick narratives available, our instinct must be that manipula-
tion is wrong, for a number of reasons.  Manipulation—especially
when contrasted with transparent conversation, as here—implies an
element of deception, and deception is always presumptively trouble-
some.  Manipulation also assumes a level of confidence on the part of
the lawyer that she is right, and that confidence must be suspect, espe-
cially given the history of professional domination of marginalized
persons.307
The best one could conclude, then, is the following.  A lawyer
representing a community group ought to appreciate her discretion to
consider the positive freedom perspective, but with a strong burden of
proof against its applicability.  She might be correct that her client is
304 Joan Laird, Theorizing Culture: Narrative Ideas and Practice Principles, in RE-VI-
SIONING FAMILY THERAPY: RACE, CULTURE, AND GENDER IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 21
(Monica McGoldrick, ed. 1998) (quoting V. Shapiro, Subjugated Knowledge and the Work-
ing Alliance: The Narratives of Russian Jewish Immigrants, 1 IN SESSION: PSYCHOTHERAPY
IN PRACTICE 9 (1995)).
305 Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 24, at 424.
306 Id.
307 The lawyer’s confidence might also be the result of common self-serving cognitive
distortions. See Langevoort, Epistemology, supra note 47, at 654-57 (describing risks of
lawyers’ cognitive biases).
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succumbing to blind passions or short-sighted misunderstanding, but
any such conclusion demands a great deal of confidence on the part of
the lawyer.  If she concludes that her client indeed fits the criteria for
such intervention, then her professional discretion includes active and
open challenging of her client’s choices—but transparently so, without
manipulation, and with considerable humility and tentativeness.
CONCLUSION
The training of lawyers for years has established ethical and prac-
tice protocols based upon an individual representation model, or, if
they contemplated a form of collective representation, they have envi-
sioned formal, structured entities with powerful constituents.  The
good lawyers who represent the dispossessed, the exploited, and the
powerless need to craft different protocols, ones which accept messier,
less organized, and often contentious group representation.  Writing
about the ethical and political mission of “community lawyers” has
flourished, but that scholarship has tended to elide some knotty prac-
tical questions about the lawyers’ professional responsibilities in their
work with such groups.  This Article is a beginning attempt to review
community group representation through the lens of a traditional “law
of lawyering” perspective.
A lawyer who accepts a “community group” as her client must
attend to all of the professional ethical mandates applicable to more
conventional corporate and partnership representation.  She must dis-
tinguish with great care whether her client is an aggregate of commu-
nity members, or an entity, and much will depend on the outcome of
that discernment.  The lawyer must engage the group members to as-
sist them to decide which of those statuses will apply, and, in doing so,
she must be clear about her relationship with the members as they
make that choice.
If the community group lawyer accepts the group as her client,
she must uncover, or create, an authority scheme on which she may
rely for her direction.  Once she has accomplished that, the commu-
nity group lawyer may counsel her clients in ways different from how
she would counsel an individual client with an individual legal matter.
In representing any entity, the lawyer will owe to the entity constitu-
ents a different—one might say lesser—deference for their prefer-
ences and their leanings, because of their status as proxies for a larger
client.  The more loosely-structured the entity is (and there is much
evidence that community group representation will involve many
loosely-structured groups), the greater the responsibility of the lawyer
to ensure that the constituent with whom she meets is a faithful proxy
for the wishes of the group.
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In addition to attending to her ethical responsibilities emerging
from the very fact that her client is a group, the community lawyer
must recognize further special duties from the fact that her client is
not just a group, but a community group.  This Article has uncovered
three considerations peculiar to the community group representation
context.  For those groups with explicit public missions, the lawyer has
a responsibility to attend to that mission, in ways she may not have
permission to do for groups established to achieve purely private ends.
At the same time (and often at odds with the prior commitment), the
community group lawyer must attend with special care to the empow-
erment and group cohesion aspects of the group’s work.  Finally (and,
again, at odds with the prior commitment), the community group law-
yer may at times possess some moral duty to intervene with her group
client to establish conditions, even if not chosen by the group, which
are likely to increase the autonomy and the power of the group in the
long run.
The ideas puzzled through in this Article emerge from the rich
literature from so many progressive scholars over the past twenty-five
years or more.  The ideas need to be tested, nurtured and critiqued,
though, especially by more stories from the field.  The test of the ethi-
cal ideas will come from their usefulness in practice.308
308 As two noted pragmatists have written:
Of one thing we may be sure.  If inquiries are to have substantial basis, if they are not
to be wholly in the air, the theorist must take his departure from the problems which
men actually meet in their own conduct.  He may define and refine these; he may
divide and systematize; he may abstract the problems from their concrete contexts in
individual lives; he may classify them when he has thus detached them; but if he gets
away from them, he is talking about something his own brain has invented, not about
moral realities.
JOHN DEWEY & JAMES TUFTS, ETHICS 212 (1908) (quoted in Paul R. Tremblay, The New
Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 489 (1999)).
